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iPreface
This master thesis was written during the spring of 2015. The thesis is carried out as a part of the
Subsea Technology MSc at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), and
concerns the reliability assessment of subsea BOP control systems.
Professor Marvin Rausand brought up the title, reliability assessment of subsea BOP control
systems.
The reader is assumed to have basic knowledge about the petroleum industry and knowl-
edge about safety reliability, equivalent to the books Rausand and Høyland (2004) and Rausand
(2014).
Some of the definitions used in the report are from the International Electrotechnical Vo-
cabulary (IEV) http://www.electroperdia.org. References to the vocabulary are given in
the text as IEV xxx-yy-zz, where xxx refers to the chapter, and yy-zz is the number of the defini-
tion.
Trondheim, 2015-06-10
————————————–
Øyvind Korsvik Sætre
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Summary
The subsea blowout preventer (BOP) and the BOP control system were the most important con-
tributors to the Macondo accident in April 2010. A BOP is a large valve system used during the
drilling phase; to seal, control, and monitor oil and gas wells. As a consequence of the Macondo
accident, improved methods for reliability assessment of BOPs are now required.
Over the years, several subsea BOP reliability studies have been performed, where techni-
cal solutions and potential failures are thoroughly investigated. As a result of the information
gained, both maintenance and reliability of the BOP systems have improved. Despite overall
improvements, the BOP is still a main contributor to risk and downtime in the drilling phase. A
deeper look into the reliability reports reveals the control system of the BOP as the root of the
majority of failures.
Most subsea BOPs are equipped with a multiplex control system with a combination of elec-
tronics and hydraulics, used to operate the different functions of the BOP. Despite the high level
of redundancy, several sections of the system are subject to critical system failures.
To prevent BOP failures, national regulations and standards have been developed in several
countries. Most of the national requirements are similar, but there are also differences. These
similarities and differences are illustrated in this study through a detailed comparison between
the relevant regulations and standards in Norway and the United States, with respect to general-,
design- and operational BOP requirements.
The main focus of this study is the multiplex subsea BOP control system. The potential crit-
ical failures of this system are identified and analyzed in a detailed failure mode, effects, and
criticality analysis (FMECA). This analysis shows that the shuttle valve, the pod selector valve,
the subsea accumulators, and the fluid reservoir are the most safety-critical parts of the control
system.
The BOP control system has several redundant elements and these may be vulnerable to
common-cause failures. The potential common-cause failures are examined in this study and
found to have a significant influence on the reliability of the control system.
Improving current reliability assessments of subsea BOP control systems requires a thorough
review of both the system and the previously used methods. In this study, a fault tree analysis is
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performed to reveal the relevant failure combinations. To improve reliability calculations pro-
vided by common fault tree analysis programs, a post-processing of the minimal cut sets in a
spreadsheet (i.e., Excel) is proposed to cover the effect of common-cause failures. The method
gives a more conservative and accurate approximation compared to the existing methods.
An event tree analysis is performed to cover the switching phases between the two pods,
showing the time dependencies that can influence the consequences. This type of switching
cannot be modeled in the fault tree, therefore, recommendations to apply the event tree analysis
to similar situations to get a more accurate reliability estimate, is given.
For components such as the shear ram, a perfect function test cannot be conducted. In
the performed analysis, no such components are evaluated. However, in an expanded analy-
sis of the subsea BOP control system, such components will be involved, therefore, adding the
contribution from the proof test coverage factor to components prone to imperfect testing, is
recommended.
vSammendrag
Undervannsutblåsningsventilen (bedre kjent som BOP) og BOP kontrollsystemet var blant de
utløsende faktorene i Macondo-ulykken april 2010. En BOP er et stort ventilsystem brukt un-
der borefasen for å; forsegle, kontrollere og overvåke olje og gassbrønner. Som et resultat av
Macondo-ulykken kreves nå forbedrede metoder for pålitelighetsanalyser av BOP’er.
Gjennom årene har flere pålitelighetsanalyser på undervanns BOP’er blitt utført, hvor tekniske
løsninger og potensielle feil har blitt grundig undersøkt. Som et resultat har både vedlikeholdet
og påliteligheten til BOP’er blitt forbedret. Til tross for en generell forbedring, er BOP’er fortsatt
en av hovedårsakene bak risiko og nedetid i borefasen. Undersøkelser av pålitelighetsrapporter
avslører kontrollsystemet til BOP’en som rotårsaken til flertallet av feilene.
Majoriteten av undervanns BOP’er er utstyrt med et multiplex kontrollsystem, som er en
kombinasjon av elektronikk og hydraulikk, brukt til å operere de forskjellige funksjonene i BOP’en.
Til tross for mye redundans, er systemet fortsatt utsatt for kritiske feil.
For å forhindre BOP feil, er nasjonale forskrifter og standarder utviklet i flere land. Flertallet
av de nasjonale forskriftene er like, men forskjeller finnes. Likhetene og forskjellene er i opp-
gaven illustrert gjennom en detaljert sammenligning mellom relevante forskrifter fra Norge og
Amerikas forente stater, med fokus på generelle-, utformings-, og operasjonelle BOP krav.
Hovedfokuset for denne oppgaven er det multiplexede undervanns BOP kontrollsystemet.
De potensielle kritiske feilene i systemet er identifisert og analysert i en detaljert feilmode, effek-
ter og kritikalitets analyse. Analysen viser at skyttelventilen, pod velgerventilen, undervannsakku-
mulatorene og væske reservoaret er de mest sikkerhetskritiske delene av kontrollsystemet.
BOP kontrollsystemet har flere redundante elementer som kan være utsatt for felles feil.
Potensialet for felles feil er undersøkt i oppgaven og funnet til å ha en signifikant påvirkning
på påliteligheten til systemet.
For å forbedre nåværende pålitelighetsvurderinger av undervanns BOP kontrollsystemer,
kreves en grundig gjennomgang av både systemet og tidligere brukte metoder. I denne studien
er en feiltreanalyse anvendt for å avsløre mulige feilårsaker. For å forbedre eksisterende feiltre
kalkulasjoner, er en metode for å post-prosessere de minimale kutt setene i et regneark (dvs.,
Excel) foreslått for å ta høyde for bidraget fra felles feil.
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En hendelsestreanalyse er utført for å dekke vekslingsfasen mellom to poder for å vise at
tidsavhengighet kan dirkete påvirke konsekvensen. Denne typen veksling kan ikke bli mod-
ellert inn i et feiltre, derfor anbefales det å anvende et hendelsestre for liknende situasjoner for
å oppnå et mer nøyaktig pålitelighets estimat.
For komponenter som skjæravstengeren kan ikke en perfekt funksjonstest utføres. I analy-
sen er ingen slike komponenter evaluert. I en utvidet analyse av undervanns BOP kontrollsys-
temet vil slike komponenter bli involvert, derfor anbefales det å legge til bidraget fra sikker test
dekningsfaktoren til komponenter utsatt for ufullkommen testing.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Background
The Macondo accident occurred on April 20th 2010, 11 people were killed, and approximately
4.9 million barrels of crude oil were spilled into the ocean. The accident caused the largest off-
shore oil spill ever, and the president of the United States declared it the biggest environmental
catastrophe ever to occur in the country’s history. The accident was caused by a blowout in the
Macondo well, drilled by the Transocean-owned rig, Deepwater Horizon (DWH). The rig crew
lost control of the situation and hydrocarbons emerged up to the drill floor, shortly after the
hydrocarbons were ignited, eventually causing the DWH to sink.
Accident commissions later formed to investigate the event, pointed to the subsea blowout
preventer (BOP) as one of the main reasons for the accident. The BOP is a safety critical sys-
tem used to ensure safe drilling and well interventions. The main function of the BOP is to
seal the well in the event of a blowout. In the aftermath of the DWH investigations reports, re-
newed focus was brought to the BOP, and enhanced BOP reliability assessments methods were
demanded.
Several reports on the quantification of the subsea BOP reliability have been published over
the years, especially by Per Holand. The reports are based on collection and analysis of rig spe-
cific failure data, and have resulted in a great amount of knowledge about BOP failures, failure
causes, maintenance and testing. A recurring source of failure in several of the reports is the
BOP control system.
1
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To find the weaknesses in a system, such as the BOP control system, requires a great deal of
work. Several master thesis have been written about BOP systems, but satisfactory methods for
quantifying the subsea BOP control system are still lacking.
Quantification of the subsea BOP reliability has mostly been based on test intervals and esti-
mated failure rates. In Klakegg (2012), the contribution from common cause failures (CCFs) are
also taken into consideration, however, this analysis considers the entire BOP system. A poten-
tial improvement from the previous analyses could be to include the CCFs contribution in an
analysis for the part of the BOP system where most failures occur, the control system.
Subsea BOP systems must comply with certain relevant standards and regulations. These
are frequently updated and can vary depending on where the system is located. Designers and
operators are therefore required to continually follow up the requirements for their present situ-
ation. For subsea BOPs, the most relevant guidelines and standards are for example, IEC-61511
(2011), IEC-61508 (2005), and NOG - 070 (2004).
The methods applied for quantifying the reliability are based on theoretical principles from
reliability engineering, and the majority of these are covered in Rausand and Høyland (2004)
and Rausand (2014). However, these theories may in some cases not be fully adequate.
To prevent accidents like the Macondo blowout, new/improved methods for complex safety
critical systems, such as the subsea BOP system, must be developed. The main focus when ap-
plying such methods is to produce an accurate result as possible. This report takes a deeper look
into the subsea BOP control system, and how its current reliability analyses can be enhanced.
1.2 Objectives
The main objectives of this study are:
1. Carry out and document a literature survey on the current status of the reliability perfor-
mance of subsea BOP control systems (incl. regulations and standards) and to reveal the
role of these systems in drilling accidents.
2. Become familiar with the design of a typical subsea BOP control system.
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
3. Perform a functional analysis of a subsea BOP control system and carry out a detailed
FMECA for different operational modes/scenarios.
4. Carry out a reliability assessment of a subsea BOP control system.
1.3 Limitations
The report is limited to only considering the reliability of BOP control system designed for deep-
water drilling. No human factors are considered and the scope ends when the shear ram is acti-
vated.
The emphasis of the reliability analysis lies in the methodology, rather than the detailed
modeling of the subsea BOP control system.
1.4 Structure of the Report
The rest of the report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 gives a description of the subsea BOP
control system. Chapter 3 discusses previous reliability studies and looks at potential failures
in the subsea BOP control system. In chapter 4, an overview of regulations and standards are
presented, as well as a comparison between Norwegian and United States regulations and stan-
dards. Chapter 5 discusses failures in the system and the potential contribution from CCFs.
Chapter 6 provides an approach to quantify the subsea BOP control systems reliability, through
post-processing the minimal cut sets from the fault tree analysis, and a discussion about the
following result. In chapter 7, the report is summarized and concluded, and recommendations
and ideas for further work are suggested.
Chapter 2
Subsea BOP Control System
The blowout preventer (BOP) control system is the brain of the subsea BOP system. It controls
when the preventers are to close and open, with or without using primary rig power. The most
essential parts of the system are the accumulators, the operating fluid, the high pressure piping
to transport and direct fluid and the remote unit for controlling valves with the hydraulic unit
(Goins and Sheffield, 1983). The main BOP components with a short description is shown in
Fig. 2.1.
2.1 Multiplex Control System
A multiplex control system (MUX) is an electro-hydraulic system applied to control the func-
tions of a subsea BOP. The MUX system is a replacement for the all-hydraulic system, previously
used for subsea BOP applications. The basic layout of a MUX control system from topside to sea
bottom is shown in Fig. 2.2.
The MUX system provides electrical power, hydraulic power, control signals and communi-
cation to the numerous BOP functions. It uses modems (modulator/demodulator) to send and
receive signals to and from control computers, via copper wires. The cable goes from the rig
and down along the riser to the BOP. The multi conductor cables carry the multiplexed signals
in both directions. The power is provided by the Power and Communication Cabinets (A & B).
Each cabinet has a dedicated uninterruptible power supply (UPS) delivering 230 VAC electrical
power. It has the ability to power the BOP system for a minimum of two hours, should the main
4
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Figure 2.1: Typical configuration of a subsea BOP, from Grondahl (2015)
CHAPTER 2. SUBSEA BOP CONTROL SYSTEM 6
Driller’s Panel Toolpusher’s PanelCentral Control Unit
Redundant 
System
Surface 
Accumulators
Hydraulic 
Fluid 
Reservoir 
and HPU
Sub-sea
Accumulators
Accumulator PressureRegulator
Regulated Fluid  Pressure
MUX Cable 
Reel
Active Pod
Electrical Signal
BOP/LMRP
BASIC MULTIPLEX SYSTEM
Figure 2.2: Basic MUX system, from Rees and Matthews (2011)
power be lost (Engineering Services LP, 2014).
The MUX control system is housed on the lower marine riser package (LMRP). Stingers con-
nect the hydraulic control between the LMRP and the BOP stack. The stingers are located at the
bottom of the LMRP and are extended to fit into recipients on the BOP side (stingers are shown
in Fig. 2.4). When connection is made, each individual seal is activated by the corresponding
stinger to prevent leakages.
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Figure 2.3: Driller’s panel, from Imperial Oil and ExxonMobile (2009)
2.2 MUX Control Panels
Normally, three control panels controls the MUX system, driller’s control panel (DCP), tool-
pusher’s panel (TCP) and a remote panel. The DCP is located on the rig floor, while the TCP
is on the bridge. They both contain a set of pushbuttons controlling the BOP functions. Func-
tions of high criticality are often equipped with covers, seen in the left hand picture in Fig. 2.3.
Alarms indicating abnormal fluid level, pressure and "read backs", are shown in the right hand
side picture.
The remote control panel contains the same functions to operate the BOP, and can be done
remotely from the hydraulic control manifold or the central processor. The panel is required
to be explosion proof or air-purged and is normally placed in the toolpusher’s quarters, or in
similar nonhazardous areas (Hals and Molnes, 1984).
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Figure 2.4: Complete pod with covers removed, adapted from Imperial Oil and ExxonMobile
(2009)
2.3 MUX Control Pod
The MUX control pod is an electro-hydraulic valve control mounted on the LMRP. Normally
there are two pods, but systems including three do exist. They are identical, interchangeable
and can be installed in the blue or yellow position (see Fig. 2.1 for placement). Each pod con-
sists of hydraulic pressure regulators, solenoid pilot valves, subsea electronic modules (SEMs),
subsea transducer modules (STMs), hydraulic valves and hydraulic accumulators (Engineering
Services LP, 2014). Both pods receive commands from the MUX and initiate solenoid valve ac-
tions; however, only one does it with hydraulic fluid, causing the effect of the other pod to be
none. A pod without covers and named elements is shown in Fig. 2.4.
Both pods can perform all required functions on the BOP, making them redundant. How-
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ever, a problem occurring in one of the pods will cause the system to be retrieved to the surface
for repair. A major problem occurring during operations would cause the system control to be
transferred to the other pod. Preparations for retrieving the riser and the LMRP, will immedi-
ately start. Situations where problems can be considered minor, may prevent the system from
retrievement (Shanks et al., 2003).
An example of the control systems logic for an element closure in a subsea BOP is shown in
Fig. 2.5. The hydraulic fluid is transported from the reservoir bank, through rigid and flexible
conduit lines in the umbilical and ending in the conduit valve package (Drægebø, 2014). In the
conduit valve package a pod selector directs the fluid to one of the pods. Before entering the
pod, the fluid pressure is controlled/adjusted by a hydraulic regulator.
Each pod contains a low-pressure accumulator and a solenoid valve for each preventer. The
generated low-pressure fluid is directed via a shuttle valve and into a pilot valve, opening for the
high pressure fluid to go to the preventer(s) through hard lines.
An example of the process in Fig 2.5 could be: A situation requiring a BOP ram to close, a
MUX signal would be sent from the central control unit to the pod for decoding. The decoded
signal would notify the specific solenoid valve to open, causing the low-pressure hydraulic fluid
to open the pilot valve. As a result, the pilot valve would shift and send stored high-pressurized
hydraulic fluid from the accumulator to the BOP ram for closure.
2.4 Subsea Electronic Module
For each MUX control pod placed on the BOP, a corresponding subsea electronic module (SEM)
is installed. The SEM is a sealed pressure vessel protecting the subsea electronics and bat-
teries against the subsea environment. The SEM is internally redundant containing two pro-
grammable logical controllers (PLCs), two 9-volt battery packs and two automatic mode func-
tion/deadman cards (Engineering Services LP, 2014). The internally redundant systems are re-
ferred to as SEM A and SEM B. The inside of the pods, and the placement of the SEMs are dis-
played in Fig. 2.6.
During normal operations, a 230 VAC electrical power supply voltage feeds the two power
supplies inside the SEM. The main control cable goes from the topside equipment and to an
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Figure 2.5: Example of a BOP element function electro-hydraulic control system principle, from
Strand (2014)
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Figure 2.6: Inside of a POD, from Engineering Services LP (2014)
electrical connector mounted in the base plate on the pod. The power conductors are connected
with the power supply, while signal conductors are connected to the MUX system modem. The
modem controls both the uplink and downlink communication for the system. Analog data
signals from pressure transducers and other sensors are digitally converted before transmitted
to the surface. All-important values for pressure and voltage are monitored by this system. A
SEM with and without housing is displayed in Fig. 2.7.
2.5 Solenoid Valve
In a subsea BOP application, a solenoid valve (SV) is a hydraulic valve activated by an electrical
signal from the control system, which produces a pressure output by opening an internal valve
(Engineering Services LP, 2014). Normally the SV is equipped with two redundant coils within
its core. One or both coils can be energized by a 24/27 VDC power supply, causing actuation of
a hydraulic valve.
Commands from the rig are sent through the MUX control system and converted by the
CHAPTER 2. SUBSEA BOP CONTROL SYSTEM 12
Figure 2.7: Example of a SEM with and without housing, from Engineering Services LP (2014)
SEMs to numerous actions, operating the BOP functions hydraulically. The electrical outputs
from the SEMs are converted into hydraulic fluid actions, using the SV. When the SV is electri-
cally energized, the magnetic forces in the coil pull the armature of the solenoid into the space
within the coil and open the valve (Engineering Services LP, 2014). When the coil is deenger-
gized, a spring pushes the armature back, closing the valve. In systems with redundant coils,
activation of one coil is enough to actuate the solenoid. However, in the Macondo accident it
came apparent how critical the polarity of the coils is. One of the coils was wired with oppo-
site polarity, and the magnetic effect was canceled out. In this case the valve would not open,
despite energizing both coils.
The hydraulic section of the SVs use sliding metal-to-metal, shear type seals, the same as the
main BOP control valves (Cameron Controls). The SVs are arranged and installed in a way that
makes them easily accessible from the outside of the MUX package (see Fig. 2.4).
The SVs need to endure pressure in the range of 3000 to 5000 psi, and temperatures down to
1.6 °C. As a result, the valves are enclosed in a heavy stainless steel housing (shown in Fig. 2.8)
for protection. It also includes cable assemblies, allowing the SV to be plug-connected to the
control system (Engineering Services LP, 2014).
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Figure 2.8: Typical BOP solenoid valve, from Engineering Services LP (2014)
2.6 Cable
Communication between the rig and a subsea BOP primarily goes through cable. There are two
types of cables applied, hydraulic and MUX. The different cables each belong to one of the dif-
ferent control systems, the all hydraulic system and MUX system, which both holds advantages
and disadvantages.
In a hydraulic cable, individual hydraulic lines represent all the BOP functions. The cable
consists of numerous small hydraulic lines wrapped around a thick line for the hydraulic supply,
going to the accumulators. The deeper the well, the longer it takes for the hydraulic system to
activate the BOP functions. The hydraulic system is therefore not recommended for deep water
drilling, as it also requires more hydraulic fluid and more pressure to be pumped.
In a MUX cable only electrical signals and power supplies are sent down to the control pods.
The pods have PLCs to decode the signals, before forwarding the commands. The hydraulic fluid
for the accumulators is sent via a separate line. The distance does not affect the multiplexed line
and the pods will receive a command from the surface instantaneously. The MUX cables are
most common nowadays for subsea BOP control systems. Compared to the all hydraulic they
are costs reduced, size of lines are decreased and problems with retrieving and running large
hose bundles are removed.
The MUX cables are stored on reels on the platform. The reels are equipped with slip rings,
allowing circuitry to be maintained during reel rotation. The cable is normally equipped with
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Figure 2.9: MUX cable, from Imperial Oil and ExxonMobile (2009)
four power supplies wires and 6-12 communication conductors. Typically, the cable has an
outer diameter of 1-1/2" (Imperial Oil and ExxonMobile, 2009). A typical MUX cable is shown in
Fig. 2.9.
2.7 Hydraulic Power Unit
The hydraulic power unit (HPU) mixes, monitors, stores hydraulic fluid and generates pressur-
ized hydraulic fluid for BOP system control usage. The hydraulic fluid helps operate the numer-
ous BOP functions and surface accumulators, going via regulators and manifolds.
The HPU pressure is normally in the range of 3000 to 5000 psi and is charged with three or
four electric powered triplex pumps, with one typically connected to the emergency generator.
The accumulators are charged with enough energy to operate all the BOP stack functions.
The fluid going through the system is a mixture of water and water-soluble oil, with a ratio
ranging from 1:50 - 1:100. In cases where temperatures gets too low, glycol antifreeze is mixed
into the fluid, preventing the lines from freezing (Hals and Molnes, 1984).
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2.8 Accumulators
Requirements to having three different sets of accumulators in a MUX subsea BOP system is
given:
1. Topside
2. On the LMRP
3. On the BOP stack
Normally, two accumulator banks provide pilot pressure to the pod pressure regulators.
Each bank consisting of four small accumulators, see Fig. 2.4.
The accumulators are precharged nitrogen bottles containing hydraulic fluid under pres-
sure (Hawker, 2011). Each accumulator has a predefined pressure, dependent on the operating
water depth. The charge pressure from the accumulator banks is controlled by "bleeding" and
"feeding" short pulses from the controlling solenoid valves (Cameron Controls).
API 53 (2012) specifies time limits for executing each of the BOP functions, typically at 30,
40 or 60 seconds. The subsea accumulators can be considered batteries charged with hydraulic
fluid, applied to fulfill the requirements. Should the umbilical be disconnected or broken, will
the LMRP functions be activated either through remotely operated vehicle (ROV) operations or
acoustic control.
Both for topside and stack mounted accumulators are the supply systems arranged in the
same way. Charged to the right pressure and automatically recharged when the pressure drops
too low. The blue and yellow control pods share the same accumulator, causing a leakage to
affect both pods. To ensure that a failure on one pod does not affect the accumulator, the hy-
draulic supply system is equipped with accumulator isolation valves. Closing of the valves and
regaining control topside will influence the closing time of each preventer severely.
Accumulators located subsea on the BOP stack is normally precharged up to 1200 psi, plus
the hydrostatic pressure. Retrieving the accumulators requires the pressure to be bled off sub-
sea, preventing the accumulators from bursting once they reach the surface or before.
The main contribution from the accumulators is to reduce the response time from the sys-
tem, and absorb shock waves caused by high pressure and flow, as a result of function activation.
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2.9 Programmable Logic Controller
A programmable logic controller (PLC) is an industrial computer that receives and interprets
signals from the rig deck, and forwards commands. Normally, the subsea MUX PLCs communi-
cate with computers on the rig and subsea, but can in emergency situations operate on its own
(Engineering Services LP, 2014). During operations, the PLCs continually cycles through pro-
grammed inputs. All control computers react as predefined when receiving communications
on the bus network.
2.10 Relay
A relay can be considered a small electrical switch, enabled by electric signals from the control
system. It can have several different outputs and is normally used to control inputs to other
logical devices or small power activations.
2.11 Subsea Transducer Module
Subsea transducer modules (STM) facilitate wiring and electronics to the temperature and pres-
sure transmitters used in the MUX system in each pod.
2.12 Hose Bundles and Reels
The hydraulic hose bundles transport the fluid from the master control manifold and down to
the blue and yellow control pods. Normally the supply line has an inner diameter (ID) of 1.0".
The hose bundles are connected to the master control manifold by jumper hoses and are
mounted on big reels for storing and handling.
2.13 Typical Control Fluid
Fig. 2.10 shows a typical arrangement of a BOP control fluid circuit. The accumulator increases
the fluid pressure to 3000-5000 psi, from thereon the fluid is sent via the pod selector valve and
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further down to one of the pods.
When the hydraulic control fluid is transported from the surface to the pods, a significant
pressure drop occurs over the normally 1" ID cable. As a result, the flow rate from the surface
accumulator is limited. The stack-mounted accumulators therefore assist with boosting the
BOP open-/closing time response, to an acceptable level.
Should a fault occur or maintenance is required on one of the accumulators, total isolation
from the circuit can be done with isolator pilot valves. Both surface and subsea accumulator
valves gets blocked, isolating the accumulators from the line. They are brought back on the line
when the isolator pilot valves are moved in the opposite direction.
The hydraulic manifold contains a flow meter for volumetric measuring of the control fluid.
An accurate flow meter can record how much of the fluid volume is consumed by the subsea
system, and indicate if something is wrong.
The initial pressure produced in the accumulator is too high for most BOP stack functions.
As a result, pressure regulators are mounted on top of the pods. Normally a BOP control system
consists of 2-3 regulators. One dedicated to regulate the pressure on the marine riser ball joint,
one for the annular preventers and one for the ram preventers (Hals and Molnes, 1984).
In Fig. 2.10 the selector valve shows two potential sources controlling the pressure. With the
selector valve in the UNIT position, the air regulator mounted on the master hydraulic manifold
adjusts the pressure. When the selector is in the REMOTE position, the operator, through push
buttons, controls the pressure. By energizing solenoid valves corresponding to the given com-
mand, adjustments through the air pilot regulator are made. A monitoring line for the subsea
pressure is sent up to the pressure gauge on the manifold, and further directed to indicators in
the driller’s panel.
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Figure 2.10: Typical control fluid pressure regulator circuit, from Hals and Molnes (1984)
Chapter 3
Reliability Review
There are two types of BOP failures considered important: (i) Failures that prevents the BOP
from acting as a safety barrier or making the BOP unable to perform a safety function, and (ii)
failures resulting in drilling stop and thereby causing economic losses.
The following review is conducted to highlight the significant contribution to downtime on
subsea BOPs caused by the control system.
Z Reliability: The ability of an item to perform a required function under stated environmental
and operational conditions and for a stated period of time (IEV ref 192-01-24).
3.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews several reliability reports on subsea BOP equipment. The review is carried
out to highlight critical BOP issues, and be an indicator to where greater focus regarding reliabil-
ity for a subsea BOP system should be. The review is based on the three following study reports,
assigned simpler names for readability:
• Study 1 - Phase I DW, examined the reliability of subsea BOPs applied in wells drilled in
more than 400 meters water depth in Norway and Brazil, during 1992-1996. The study is
further discussed and analyzed in Holand and Awan (2012) and Holand (1999).
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• Study 2 - Reliability of Subsea BOP Systems for Deepwater Application, Phase II DW. It ex-
amines the reliability of subsea BOPs applied in wells drilled above 400 meters to more
than 2000 meters water depth in the Gulf of Mexico (GOM), during 1997-1998. The study
is further discussed and analyzed in Holand (1999).
• Study 3 - Reliability of Deepwater Subsea BOP Systems and Well Kicks. Looks at the relia-
bility of subsea BOPs applied in wells drilled in more than 600 meters in the GOM, during
2007-2009. The study is further discussed and analyzed in Holand and Awan (2012).
3.2 BOP General Reliability
The studies introduces different expressions, the following are used frequently in this review.
• BOP failure can be a failure of a single component or a control system failure. A BOP
failure does not necessarily lead to retrievement of the system, because of the redundancy
in the system.
• BOP days are the total number of days from when the BOP is attached to the wellhead,
until it is retrieved for the last time.
• Mean time to failure (MTTF) is the average time for the first failure of a component on the
BOP. The MTTF is the inverse of the failure rate, for systems with constant failure rates.
• Safety critical failures can occur after the installation test of the subsea BOP is completed.
The BOP acts as a well barrier, and failures are therefore critical. The importance of a
failure depends on which part of the BOP system fails.
• Hours lost refer to the number of hours were drilling is suspended, caused by failures on
equipment.
3.2.1 Mean Time To Failure
A comparison of the three studies with respect to MTTF and average downtime is shown in Tab.
3.1. It should be noted that the sources of information in the different studies differ. Study 1
CHAPTER 3. RELIABILITY REVIEW 21
and 2 uses daily drilling reports, whereas study 3 is based on the well activity reports. In the
well activity reports, less critical failures with little downtime are often not reported, and will
not show up in the comparison, making the analysis somewhat degraded. The most important
results from the studies are listed below.
• In study 1, the MTTF was approximately 23 days, with an average downtime of 25 hours
per failure.
• In study 2, the MTTF was approximately 34 days, with an average downtime of 31 hours
per failure.
• In study 3, the MTTF was approximately 96 days, with an average downtime of 86 hours
per failure.
Comparing study 1 and 2 reveals a slight difference. Study 2 has a higher MTTF, but the
average downtime per failure is also higher.
In study 3, the differences from the two previous studies are much bigger. The MTTF has
almost tripled, but the repair time for a component also increased significantly. The changed
MTTF came as a result of improved equipment on the BOP. For the increased repair time, no ex-
plicit reason was given in the reports other than the effect of the increased water depth. Despite
the increased pulling length, the downtime would most likely not be tripled. Other factors that
may have contributed could be the increased complexity of the system, changed maintenance
routines once the equipment already is pulled, bad weather or unavailability of spare parts.
3.2.2 BOP Downtime
Z BOP downtime: The number of hours lost because of a failure on the BOP, regardless of the
BOP being attached to the wellhead or not (Holand and Awan, 2012).
In study 1, the average downtime per BOP day was 1.08 hours. The biggest contribution to
the downtime came from the control system and choke/kill line failures (MCS Kenny, 2013).
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Table 3.1: BOP MTTF and average downtime, from Holand and Awan (2012) and Holand (1999).
Study Location of
Subsea BOPs
Period No. of
Wells
BOP-
days
Total lost
time (hrs)
No. of
failures
MTTF
(BOP-
days)
Avg.
downtime
per failure
(hr.)
Avg.
downtime
per BOP-day
(hrs)
1 Brazil and
Norway, wells
drilled in water
depth more
than 400 m
1992 –
1996
144 3,191 3457.5 138 23.12 25.05 1.08
2 GOM, wells
drilled in 400 m
to more than
2000 m
1997 –
1998
83 4,009 3637.5 117 34.26 31.09 0.91
3 GOM wells
drilled in water
depth more
than 600 m
2007 –
2009
259 15,056 13,448 156 96.51 86.21 0.89
In study 2, the average downtime per BOP day was 0.91 hours. In this study, the downtime
was mainly caused by failures in the ram preventers. The preventers failed to open on three
different occasions, this was not observed in early stages of BOP testing. The accident report
concluded that it came as a result of new designs (MCS Kenny, 2013).
In study 3, the average downtime per BOP day was 0.89 hours, which was the lowest of all
three studies. The main contribution to the down time came as a result of a failure occurring on
the control system were only the LMRP needed to be retrieved. This caused the BOP stack to be
left on the wellhead, avoiding major downtime.
3.2.3 BOP Failure Discussion
For a failure to be critical in terms of well control, the BOP must be an acting barrier. The BOP
is first considered an acting barrier when attachment on the wellhead is made and the instal-
lation test is completed and accepted. All failures occurring on the BOP after installation are
considered safety critical failures. The severity of a failure depends on which part of the systems
is compromised.
The failure distribution of the different BOP studies is shown in Fig. 3.1. The average down-
time per hour for the main components in the BOP are listed. The control system is likely to
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Figure 3.1: Comparison of BOP item specific downtime, from Holand and Awan (2012)
cause the most downtime in all three studies, with the exception of the ram preventers in study
2. The control system failures were revealed during function tests. However, a failure in the
control system will most likely not compromise the well control, because of its redundancy.
A summary of the number of failures and the corresponding percentages for the main BOP
components are shown in Tab. 3.2, revealing the subsea BOP control system as the biggest con-
tributor to equipment failure in all studies. The failures are revealed by function tests performed
every 7 days, as required by The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE), title
30, part 250.449. Failure data from study 1 is restricted. Summing up Tab. 3.2, the most impor-
tant values are:
• Study 1: 45% of all failures came from the control system.
• Study 2: 60 of the total 117 failures, 51%, came from the control system
• Study 3: 72 of the total 156 failures, 46%, came from the control system
The control system clearly dominates the failure rates in every study. However, the control sys-
tems include several components, making it more vulnerable to failures.
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Table 3.2: Summary of BOP failures, from Holand and Awan (2012) and Holand (1999).
Study number
1 2 3
BOP Components No. of Failures/percentage
Annular Preventer - 12/ 10% 24/ 15%
Connector - 10/ 8% 8/ 5%
Control System 45% 60/ 51% 72/46%
Choke & Kill Valve - 13/ 11% 4/ 2.5%
Choke & Kill Lines, All - 8/ 7% 17/ 11%
Ram Preventer - 11/ 9% 23/ 15%
Flexible - 1/ 0.08% 1/ 0.06%
Total 138 117 156
Table 3.3: MTTF of main BOP components, study 2 and 3, from Holand and Awan (2012) and
Holand (1999).
Study number
2 3
Component/ System MTTF Operating days/ failure
Annulars 334 627
Rams 364 655
Choke & Kill Valves 308 3,764
Choke & Kill Valves, All 501 886
Connectors 401 1,882
Control Systems 67 209
- Conventional 71 242
- MUX 46 198
Flexible Joint 4,009 15,056
MTTF for main subsea components during operating days is shown in Tab. 3.3. Note that
every single component has an increased MTTF in study 3, compared to study 2, and for the
control systems it has more than tripled. This comes as a result of development of technology
and increased robustness on the different components. No MTTF data is available on study 1 in
the public domain.
Failures that could not be assigned to the categories described in Tab. 3.2 or 3.3 have not
been taken into account in this comparison.
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3.3 Subsea BOP Control System Reliability
3.3.1 Control System Mean Time To Failure
In the different studies all three types of subsea BOP control systems are represented: Pilot hy-
draulic control system, pre-charged pilot hydraulic control system and multiplex control system
(MUX).
The pilot signal is transmitted from the rig to the subsea control pods. The main differences
between the systems are found in the pilot hydraulic control system where the pilot valves are
activated directly by a pilot signal. The pre-charged pilot hydraulic system works the same way
as the pilot hydraulic, only the pilot signal is given a pre-charged pressure, reducing the response
time. For the MUX system, an electrical signal is transmitted to the pods instantaneously, allow-
ing the subsea pilot valve to function immediately (Holand, 1999).
Study 1 and 2 was mainly dominated by pilot hydraulic or pre-charged pilot hydraulic sys-
tems. In study 3 the majority of rigs were equipped with MUX systems.
A comparison of the control systems MTTFs for the different studies is shown in Fig. 3.2. It
can be seen that the MTTF in study 3 is increasingly larger compared to the previous two. Tab.
3.1 shows that significantly more BOP days are covered in study 3. It seems that the BOPs in
general have improved compared to older studies. It should be noted that study 3 is based on
well activity reports, whereas the two others are based on daily drilling reports, as mentioned
earlier. This will have an effect on the calculated MTTF.
The MTTF for the MUX control systems and the conventional pilot control systems from
study 3 are compared in Fig. 3.3. The differences between the systems are not significant, and
similar results were found in the two other studies (Holand and Awan, 2012).
The average failure downtime for the different subsea BOP control systems in study 3 is
shown in Fig. 3.4. The MUX system had approximately double the downtime, compared to
the conventional. It should be noted that the MUX system was applied in deeper waters com-
pared to the conventional. The increased downtime mainly came as a result of a few failures
requiring a long repair time (Holand and Awan, 2012).
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Figure 3.2: Control system MTTF, comparing study 1,2 and 3, with 90% confidence limits, from
Holand and Awan (2012)
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Figure 3.3: MTTF of BOP control system in Study 3, with 90% confidence limits, from Holand
and Awan (2012)
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3.3.2 Control System Failure Discussion
The majority of the control system failures were caused by failures of components in the control
pods. For example, leakages in solenoid valves, leakage in subsea plate mounted (SPM) valves
or malfunction in stack connector regulator (MCS Kenny, 2013).
The control system failures from study 2 are presented in Tab. 3.4. Failures marked "Un-
known" are unspecified failures. Failures marked "Other", are failures specified in different cat-
egories than the ones in the table. Failures detected and resolved by switching to the back-up
system, is marked with zero loss of time.
In the MUX control system, the dominating downtime came from loss of all functions in one
pod, with an average downtime of 198.5 hours per failure. Only one incident of loosing function
in both pods occurred during the study, leading to 2.5 hours without control of the BOP.
The control system failures for study 3 are presented in Tab. 3.5. The dominating downtime
of the MUX control system came from loss of all functions in one pod, with an average downtime
of 132.7 hours per failure.
The failure causing the most downtime in both studies are "Loss of all functions one pod".
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Table 3.4: Control system failure distribution for study 2, from Holand (1999).
Type of Failure No. of
failures
Total lost
time (hrs)
Average
Downtime - per
BOP-day (hrs)
Days in
Service
(BOP-days)
Multiplex Electro Hydraulic
Loss of all functions both pods 1 2.5 2.5
Loss of all functions one pod 1 189.5 189.5
Loss of one function one pod 1 1 1
Unknown 4 17.5 4.4
Other 3 10 3.3
All 10 220.5 22.1 459
Pre-charged pilot hydraulic
Loss of all functions both pods 1 42.5 42.5
Spurious operation of BOP function (s) 1 1.75 1.8
Loss of several functions one pod 4 54.5 13.6
Loss of one function one pod 4 14 3.5
Unknown 2 7.5 3.8
Other 4 18.5 4.6
All 16 138.5 8.7 552
Pilot Hydraulic
Spurious operation of BOP function(s) 2 57.5 28.8
Loss of all functions one pod 6 173.5 28.9
Loss of several functions one pod 1 135 135
Loss of one function both pods 1 121.5 121.5
Loss of one function one pod 8 33.5 4.2
Loss of control of one topside panel 1 2 2
Unknown 3 81 27
Other 4 16 4
All 26 620 23.8 2,553
Conventional Pilot, unknown if pre-charged or not
Loss of all functions one pod 2 3.5 1.8
Loss of several functions both pods 1 0 0
Loss of several functions one pod 1 35.5 35.5
Loss of one function one pod 2 1 0.5
Unknown 2 2.25 1.1
All 8 42.25 5.3 445
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Table 3.5: Control system failure distribution for Study 3, from Holand and Awan (2012).
Type of Failure No. of
failures
Total lost
time (hrs)
Average
Downtime - per
BOP - day (hrs)
Days in
Service
(BOP-days)
Multiplex Electro Hydraulic
Loss of all functions both pods 1 192 192
Loss of all functions one pod 12 1592.5 132.7
Loss of one function both pods 4 168 42
Loss of one function one pod 10 576 57.6
Loss of several functions one pod 1 0 0
Unknown 19 1,108.5 58.3
Other 5 330 41.3
All 55 3,967 72.1 10,942
Pilot Hydraulic
Loss of all functions one pod 2 216 108
Loss of one function both pods 2 0 0
Loss of one function one pod 6 25 4.2
Loss of several functions one pod 2 504 252
Unknown 1 0 0
Other 4 0 0
All 17 745 43.8 4,114
The root cause of the failure is difficult to determine, but most likely it could come from loss of
power, loss of hydraulic, dirt entering the system or a systematic error in the programming logic.
In all three studies, all functions in both pods failed in the control systems. This is a safety
critical failure, as it leads to loss of control of the entire BOP.
Common for both studies is that only failures occurring in the system were documented,
such that no indication to what other types of failures were tested for. As a result, Tab. 3.4 and
3.5 are not equal to each other, and a satisfactory comparison is much more difficult to conduct.
Chapter 4
Regulations and Standards
In the following chapter, only Norwegian and United States (U.S.) requirements for subsea BOPs
are discussed, as they are the most relevant for this report.
4.1 American Requirements
4.1.1 BSEE
The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) provide regulations for design,
operation and maintenance of subsea BOP systems in federal waters of the U.S. Gulf of Mexico
(USGoM). Internationally, the BSEE regulations are considered the most recognized regulations
(Strand, 2014). For guidance on how to fulfill the requirements, BSEE make references to impor-
tant standards from the American Petroleum Institute (API), such as, API 53 (2012), API spec 16D
(2005), and API spec 16A. Main design requirements from BSEE for a subsea BOP, with primary
focus on the control system, are listed below (from §250.442).
The subsea BOP must:
• Have an operable dual-pod control system to ensure proper and independent operation
of the BOP system
• Have an accumulator system to provide fast closure of the BOP components and to oper-
ate all critical functions in case of a loss of the power fluid connection to the surface
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• Have two redundant BOP control panels whereof one panel on the drilling floor
• Have operational or physical barrier(s) on BOP control panels to prevent accidental dis-
connect functions
• Clearly label all control panels for the subsea BOP system
4.1.2 American Petroleum Institute
To fulfill the BSEE requirements concerning usage and design for subsea BOPs, API std 53 is
applied. The standard is considered one of the most internationally recognized, concerning
drilling. API spec 16D provides specific requirements to the design of the control system. Worth
noticing is that API spec 16D does not mention safety integrity system (SIS) terminology, as
opposed to NOG - 070 (2004), applied for the Norwegian continental shelf (NCS) (see. 4.2.3).
4.1.3 Function Testing
Despite that API std 53 is an extension of the BSEE requirements, differences can be found.
Worth noticing is the test intervals for function testing of the control system. API std 53 states
that function tests of the control system for a subsea BOP should be executed at least every 21
day (7.6.5.1.1), while BSEE set the requirement for every 14 day (§250.449). The test interval
from BSEE should therefore be applied.
Reliability data collected by Sattler and Gallander (2010) shows that failures in the control
systems are normally revealed by function tests. Sattler and Gallander (2010) states that through
the use of simple function tests, a large percentage of the failures could be discovered. Meaning
a high proof test coverage (PTC) can be obtained on the control system for a subsea BOP by
performing full proof tests.
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4.2 Norwegian Requirements
4.2.1 Petroleum Safety Authority
The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) issues operation and maintenance regulations
concerning design for subsea BOP systems in Norway. The PSA is equivalent to BSEE in the
U.S. The PSA further refers to standards for fulfillment of the requirements. The most relevant
standard for well drilling activities on the NCS is NORSOK D-001 (2012).
4.2.2 NORSOK D-001
In NORSOK D-001, descriptions of different requirements concerning drilling operations are
given. The most important features are: functionality, design, installation, testing and equip-
ment on both fixed installations and mobile offshore drilling unites (NORSOK D-001, 2012).
Several similarities can be found between the NORSOK standards and the API standards, since
both are built on the same basis. Still differences can be found, which are further discussed in
4.3.
4.2.3 NOG 070
NORSOK D-001 states that requirements for BOP control systems made in NOG-070 shall be
met. NOG-070 is an application of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 made by Norwegian Oil and Gas,
for the Norwegian petroleum industry. The following safety integrity functions (SIFs) for a BOP
control system are described in NOG-070:
1. Seal around drill pipe
2. Seal an open hole
3. Shear drill pipe and seal off well
In NOG-070, minimum safety requirements for the different functions are described with
safety integrity levels (SILs). All three BOP functions above are given a SIL 2 requirement, mean-
ing an average probability of failure on demand (PF D AV G ) in less than 1 per 100 failure.
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In NORSOK D-001 only references to the SIF is made for the control system. The SIF only
incorporates components going from the BOP control panels and down to the BOP accumulator
isolation valves (Strand, 2014). While in NOG-070, the final elements are also included in the
reliability assessment. As a result, the PF D AV G increases. Therefore, obtaining a higher SIL
requirement would be much harder following the NOG-070. The current system would have to
be changed, and more rams in standard BOP assemblies would be required (NOG - 070, 2004).
4.3 Comparison
4.3.1 BSEE vs. PSA
To highlight the differences in requirements between Norway and U.S., a summary of regula-
tions concerning subsea BOPs from BSEE and PSA is shown in Tab. 4.1. The comparison has a
basis in BSEE regulations and related PSA regulations have been added.
Cases where the requirements are the same can be found. For example, both state that the
best and safest technology should be applied, at all time. The similarities between the two are
mostly found in requirements on a general level.
The major differences between the two regulations are the specificity. The PSA requirements
focus mainly on the system on a general level, whereas the BSEE is much more specific in regard
to equipment and personnel.
The PSA mostly emphasizes that dangerous situations needs to be avoided, whereas in the
BSEE specific demands to equipment and personnel are given to prevent dangerous situations
from happening.
4.3.2 NORSOK vs. API
This comparison takes a deeper look at the control system for subsea BOPs.
Both API and NORSOK issues several standards. Comparing them up to one and other can
be difficult since non of them are equal to each other. Therefore, a comparison has been made
with a basis in NORSOK D-001 and equivalent requirements from API std 53 and API spec 16D.
NORSOK D-001 describes the requirements to the control system much like what is done in
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Table 4.1: Comparison of the BSEE and the PSA requirements for subsea BOPs.
BSEE (USA, USGoM OCS) PSA (Norway, North Sea)
General Principles
30 CFR §250.401
- Use the best available and safest drilling technology
- Have a person onsite during drilling operations that
are trained to fulfill all responsibilities
- Use and maintain equipment and materials necessary
to ensure the safety
- Ensure that the toolpusher, operator’s representative,
or a member of the drilling crew maintains continuous
surveillance on the rig floor
Activities regulations: Section 85 - Well Barriers
- During drilling and well activities, there shall be tested
well barriers with sufficient independence
- If a barrier fails, activities shall not be carried out in
the well other than those intended to restore the barrier
Design
30 CFR 250.440-451
- At least four remote-controlled BOP preventers/rams:
At least one annular preventer, two pipe rams, and one
blind-shear rams, capable of shearing any drill pipe
(including workstring and tubing)
- A dual-pod control system ensuring independent op-
eration of the BOP system
- Accumulators providing fast closure of the BOP com-
ponents and to operate all critical functions in case of
a loss of the power fluid connection to the surface
- Working-pressure rating of each BOP component
must exceed maximum anticipated surface pressures
- Subsea BOP stack equipped with ROV intervention
capability
- Operational or physical barrier(s) on BOP control
panels to prevent accidental disconnect functions
- Clearly label all control panels for the subsea BOP sys-
tem
- At least two BOP control stations. One on the drilling
floor, the other located easy accessible away from the
drilling floor
- A choke and a kill line on the BOP stack. Each line
must be equipped with two full-opening valves, both
valves in each line must be remote-controlled
Facilities regulations: Section 48 - Well barriers
- Shall be designed such that well integrity is ensured
and the barrier functions are safeguarded during the
well’s lifetime.
- Prevent influx or outflow to the environment
- Shall be designed such that their performance can be
verified
Facilities regulations: Section 49 – Well control equip-
ment
- Be designed and capable of activation such that it en-
sures both barrier integrity and well control
- Have remote-controlled valves with mechanical lock-
ing mechanisms in the closed position
- Floating facilities shall have an alternative activation
system for activating critical functions on the BOP in
the event of an evacuation
Operation
30 CFR 250.442
- Install the BOP system before drilling below the sur-
face casing, unless other requirements are given by the
District Manager
- Constantly have ROV crew available when the BOP is
deployed, as an option for use during intervention
- Before removing the marine riser, displace the fluid in
the riser with seawater
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Maintenance
30 CFR 250.446-449
- Conduct a weekly well-control drill with each drilling
crew
- Visually inspect the subsea BOP system and marine
riser at least once every 3 days
- Maintain and inspect the BOP system to ensure that
the equipment functions properly
- Stump test the subsea BOP system before installa-
tion. Perform the initial subsea BOP test on the seafloor
within 30 days of the stump test
- Alternate tests between control stations and pods
- Pressure test the blind or blind-shear ram BOP during
stump tests and at all casing points
- The interval between any blind or blind-shear ram
BOP pressure tests may not exceed 30 days
- Function test annular and ram BOPs every 7 days be-
tween pressure tests
- Document all test results and make them available to
BSEE upon request
Activities regulations: Section 45
- The responsible party shall ensure that facilities or
parts thereof are maintained, so that they are capable
of carrying out their intended functions in all phases of
their lifetime
Activities regulations: Section 47
- Fault modes that may constitute a health, safety or en-
vironment risk, cf. Section 46, shall be systematically
prevented through a maintenance programme
- This programme shall include activities for monitor-
ing performance and technical condition, which en-
sure identification and correction of failure modes that
are under development or have occurred
30 CFR 250.451
- BOP control station or pod that does not function
properly, suspend further drilling operations until that
station or pod is operable
- If activated blind shear ram or casing shear ram and
sheared pipe or casing, correct problem, and conduct a
full pressure test of the BOP stack
API std 53, while API spec 16D is much more oriented on the details of the system. References
to API spec 16D can therefore be found in NORSOK D-001. For example: "Color configuration
shall follow API Spec 16D for subsea and dry BOPs".
Despite the high level of details in API spec 16D, some additional requirements have been
made in the Norwegian regulations, compared to the two U.S. standards.
Most requirements from NORSOK D-001 are covered in the API standards, but a few ex-
ceptions can be found, see Tab. 4.2. NORSOK D-001 requires activation of the BOP from at
least three different locations, while API only requires two. NORSOK D-001 requires all electri-
cal equipment to be EX 1 proof and have a UPS, whereas API only present requirements for the
UPS. The last major difference between the standards is that the failure of one activation panel,
shall not affect activation on the remaining panels. No such requirements could be found in the
two API standards.
Differences between the standards are small, and the API covers a great deal of areas. Still
1EX is short for explosion
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some supplements have been added by the Norwegian government worth noticing.
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Table 4.2: Comparison of NORSOK vs API for control systems.
NORSOK (Norway, North Sea) API (USA, USGoM OCS)
NORSOK D-001 - 6.42.1
It shall be possible to activate the BOP from at least
three (3) locations on the facility:
- one activation panel at the driller’s position;
- independent activation panel in a safe accessible
area, reference clause 5.2 design outline 4th section;
- activated directly on the main unit (except multiplex
systems which require a 3rd remote control).
API std 53 - 7.3.14.3
-One control station location shall provide easy acces-
sibility for the drill crew.
API std 53 - 7.3.14.4
-The other control station shall be placed away from
the rig floor to provide safe access for functioning the
BOPs during an emergency well control event.
NORSOK D-001 - 6.42.1
Control panels shall clearly indicate (e.g. by means of
lights for remote panel) whether the functions are in
open or closed position.
API Spec 16D - 5.2.5.4
Panel lamps (or other means of visual indication) used
to indicate function status shall track the position of
the hydraulic control valves. Red, amber and green
shall be used as standards colors for control panel in-
dicator lights (or displays)
NORSOK D-001 - 6.42.1
The control panels shall be equipped with a secur-
ing device against unintentional operation of essential
functions (e.g. shear ram, riser connection).
API Spec 16D - 5.2.5.5
A transparent safety cover or other lock-out means that
does not obstruct visibility of function status shall be
employed to avoid unintended operation for critical
equipment.
NORSOK D-001 - 6.42.1
All electrical equipment related to activate the
BOP/diverter shall be supplied by UPS and Ex proof.
API Spec 16D - 5.4.2
Electrical power (excludning the pump system) shall be
supplied from one or more uninterruptable power sup-
plies with backup battery capacities to operate the con-
trol for at least 2 hours.
NORSOK D-001 - 6.42.1
Failure of one activation panel shall not effect activa-
tion from remaining panels.
NORSOK D-001 - 6.42.2
When calculating additional accumulator capacity for
subsea BOPs, corrections shall be made for hydrostatic
pressure of the relevant sea water column, as well as for
sea temperature.
API std 53 - 7.3.11.4
The manufacturer-supplied control system surface
base pressure, adjusted for water depth and operating
temperature, shall be used as required. Documenta-
tion of the measurement and adjustment shall be re-
tained at the rig site.
Chapter 5
Subsea BOP Control System Failures
5.1 Failure Assessment
When estimating the reliability of a safety critical system, such as the subsea BOP control sys-
tem, a process for identifying potential failures in the system should be conducted through the
use of familiarization and functional analyses. The best approach is to apply a qualitative anal-
ysis such as hazard and operability study (HAZOP), hazard identification (HAZID) or failure
mode, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA) (Drægebø, 2014). Ideally, the analysis should
involve personnel from several different disciplines with expert/extensive knowledge about the
system.
5.1.1 Safety Critical System
When analyzing the subsea BOP control system, failures that can prevent the system from per-
forming its intended safety function or process demands, are the events of highest importance.
Both these are classified as dangerous undetected (DU) failures. In the analysis for the subsea
BOP control systems, only DU-failures are considered.
It should be noted that a conventional safety critical system is not normally operated without
a process demand. However, the BOP system differs from this, as some functions are operated
during normal operation. Annular preventers, for example, are closed for stripping of the drill
pipe (Klakegg, 2012). A critical failure preventing activation of such an operation, will be dis-
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covered during normal mode, without a process demand. The analysis calculations presumes
that all failures are detected in proof tests, hence, this will in some cases not be true for the
subsea BOP control system. However, the effect of the deviation will not be significant, and the
assumption that the BOP system is a safety critical system can therefore be recognized.
5.1.2 Sources of Data
The quantitative analyses are based on failure rates and test intervals (τ) for relevant compo-
nents in the subsea BOP control system. The main sources of data are Holand and Awan (2012),
Holand (1999), Håbrekke et al. (2013) and previous master thesis work form Klakegg (2012) and
Drægebø (2014). Not all components in the analysis are covered in the data sources; as a result,
some components have "expert judgment" failure rates.
5.1.3 BOP Control System Failure Modes
Based on the previous studies, some of the typical failure modes that can cause DU-failures in a
subsea BOP control system are listed below.
• Leakage in pod selector valve
• Blue/yellow pod, SEM A/B fail to activate solenoid valve
• Topside control panels PLCs fail to signal pods
• Loss of communication with pods, because of failure in MUX cable
• Loss of hydraulic fluid in pods, because of leakage in hydraulic lines
In addition to these typical failure modes, common cause failures (CCFs) for the system
should also be identified. The next section gives a brief introduction to CCF theory, the effect of
CCF on the subsea BOP control system and how to include CCF in a reliability assessment of the
system.
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5.2 Common Cause Failures
Safety critical systems are often equipped with a high level of redundancy, and the subsea BOP
control system is no exception. Redundancy is integrated into safety critical systems to en-
hance its reliability (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2007). In the BOP system, redundancy ensures
functional safety in the event of a kick.
Before quantifying the reliability of redundant safety critical systems, categorizing potential
failures must be done. Failures are mainly divided into either random hardware- or systematic
failure. Random hardware failure are caused by natural stressors and are considered indepen-
dent failures, such that a component failure in a system is not assumed to influence the other
components failure rates, normally called aging failure (Hauge et al., 2013). Systematic failures
may come as a result of failures related to operation, excessive stress or installation, making
components in the same system potentially dependent (Hauge et al., 2013). Systematic depen-
dent failures will in most cases lead to CCFs, meaning, more than one component failing by the
same cause, within a given period. CCFs can potentially reduce the effect of redundancy in a
safety critical system (Rausand, 2014).
For redundant systems, such as the subsea BOP control system, the potential impact from
CCFs with regard to system reliability, is huge. Identification of potential CCFs and necessary
measures to prevent the failures from occurring, are extremely important before the system can
be installed (Rausand and Høyland, 2004).
5.2.1 CCF Modeling Theory
The term CCF has been discussed for a long time, and still no general definition has been ac-
cepted, meaning, people within different sectors have different opinions of what CCFs are (Rau-
sand, 2014). IEC-61508 (2005) defined CCF as: "failure, that is the result of one or more events,
causing concurrent of two or more separate channels in a multiple channel system, leading to
system failure". In the nuclear power industry CCF is defined as: “a dependent failure in which
two or more component fault states exist simultaneously, or within a short time interval, and are
a direct result of a shared cause”.
Simultaneous is an important expression to understand when categorizing failures as CCFs.
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There can be a distinct dependency between failures, even though they do not occur at the
exact same time (Hokstad and Rausand, 2008). In Stamatelatos and Dezfuli (2011), a CCF event
is defined as multiple failures occurring during the same mission. The mission is dependent
on what type of industry the system is within. For example, in the aviation industry, a CCF
event would be if multiple failures occurred during a flight. For a subsea BOP control system,
the mission time is equal to the periodic testing time. Hokstad and Rausand (2008) state that if
multiple failures occur on redundant components within the test interval (τ), it can be classified
as CCFs. The test intervals can vary in the range of hours to a year, making it more complex to
decide if failures in the same system are independent or CCFs.
5.2.2 Modeling Common Cause
Rausand (2014) implies that there exists a cause-effect relationship between the CCF event and
a certain cause. However, this is rarely reflected in most CCF models, and is in several cases
difficult to identify, and yet quantify. Causes of CCFs that can be identified, should explicitly be
modeled into, for example, a reliability block diagram (RBD) or with a fault tree analysis (FTA)
(Rausand and Høyland, 2004). Explicit modeling, even with low quality input data, is considered
more accurate compared to CCF modeling with implicit data (Rausand and Høyland, 2004).
Lundteigen and Rausand (2009) state that by applying the explicit approach to systems with
several types of common cause, such as the subsea BOP control system, may lead to large and
complex fault trees. The increased complexity may cause events to be overlooked or included
in multiple places. By applying the implicit approach the fault tree is kept simple and the CCFs
are based on the minimal cut sets (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009). The analysis in this report
will therefore be using implicit modeling of CCFs for the BOP control system.
Beta Factor Model
The beta-factor model is most commonly used, and recommended in IEC-61508 (2005) and
IEC-61511 (2011), for implicit modeling of CCFs for safety critical systems. The model assumes
that of all the failures in the system, a fraction is CCF. This fraction value is assigned to beta,β. An
occurring CCF assumes that all components in that group will fail as a result of the same cause
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(Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009). The contribution to the system from independent DU-failures
are expressed as (1−β)λDU , while failures from CCFs are expressed as βλDU .
A weakness in the beta-factor model is that voted configurations are not taken into account.
Meaning, CCFs are expected where not all redundant independent components fail, in systems
such as, 1-out-of-3 and 2-out-of-3 (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009). The PDS method adds a
correction factor taking this into account, and Hauge et al. (2013) argue for its use. In this report
the beta-factor model is preferred, easy to understand, the β parameter is easy to interpret and
it provides an adequate result.
5.2.3 CCF Data Sources
When quantifying the beta-factor, relevant and updated failure data for CCFs are important.
However, access to such data is limited, therefore other methods must be applied. In Rausand
(2014) the IEC 61508 method is mentioned, which consists of 37 relevant questions, used to
quantify the β-values. Still a satisfactory quantification is hard to perform with limited time and
knowledge.
5.2.4 Potential CCFs in Subsea BOP Control Systems
As described earlier in chapter 2, the subsea BOP control system consists of several subsys-
tems with identical and redundant components that can be exposed to CCFs, for example,
SEMs, PLCs, MUX cables, hydraulic cables, pod accumulator isolation valves, shuttle valves and
solenoid valves in each pod. To further determine what type of CCFs these components can be
exposed to, an analysis, typically FMECA or HAZOP should be performed.
Chapter 6
Analysis
The report has, so far, given a general description of the subsea BOP control system, with key
functions and system boundaries. Previous studies have been evaluated and discussed. The
most relevant failure modes for subsea BOP control systems have been presented along with
the potential contribution from CCFs. Based on previous chapters, an approach to quantifying
the reliability by conducting an FMECA followed by an FTA, is made.
6.1 FMECA
An FMECA involves reviewing numerous components, assemblies and subsystems to identify
the potential causes and effects of failures, and are often the first item of a systems reliability
study (Rausand and Høyland, 2004). Ideally, the FMECA should be performed in close coopera-
tion with the design team and is based on detailed knowledge about the system and its compo-
nents (Rausand, 2014). However, for this analysis there is limited access to such personnel, and
potential failure modes or consequence may have been overlooked. The focus of the analysis
lies therefore in the method of it.
Data Sources
The analysis performed is based on the system description of the subea BOP control systems
in chapter 2, the reliability study performed in chapter 3 involving studies such as Holand and
Awan (2012) and Holand (1999), and previous master thesis work from Drægebø (2014) and
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Table 6.1: Potential failure modes in a subsea BOP control system
Comp.
number
Component Failure
number
Some potential failures
Sub-function 1: BOP control functions
1.1 Power supply unit (topside) F-1.1.1 Transmission failure
F-1.1.2 Erratic output
1.2 Control panels (topside) F-1.2.1 Erratic output
1.3 Electric prower from back-up battery F-1.3.1 Insufficient power
1.4 Batteries in pods F-1.4.1 Insufficient power
1.5 MUX cable reel F-1.5.1 Transmission failure
1.6 CCU F-1.6.1 Control/ signal failure
F-1.6.2 Erratic output
F-1.6.3 Fail to function on demand
F-1.6.4 Spurious activation
1.7 Pod selector valve F-1.7.1 Fail to move
1.8 Blue/ yellow pod F-1.8.1 Unable to deliver hydraulic
power
1.9 Solenoid valve F-1.9.1 Fail to move
1.10 SPM valve F-1.10.1 Fail to open/ close
1.11 Shuttle valve F-1.11.1 Fail to move (stuck in
position)
1.12 Choke and kill valve F-1.12.1 Fail to open/ close
F-1.12.2 External leakage
F-1.12.3 Internal leakage
Sub-function 2: Power supply
2.1 Subsea accumulator F-2.1.1 Internal leakage
F-2.1.2 Burst bladder
2.2 Fluid reservoir F-2.2.1 Containment of reservoir
F-2.2.2 Too low volumetric capacity
F-2.2.3 Reservoir plugged
2.3 HPU F-2.3.1 Hydraulic pump failure
2.4 Hydraulic line from HPU to BOP F-2.4.1 Plugged/ choked line
F-2.4.2 External leakage
F-2.4.3 Internal leakage
2.5 Regulator valve F-2.5.1 Fail to move
2.6 Pod isolation valve F-2.6.1 Fail to open/ close
2.7 Hydraulic lines on BOP stack F-2.7.1 Internal leakage
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Klakegg (2012). The subsea BOP control system is broken down to approximately 30 compo-
nents, which will be further analyzed.
Subsea BOP Control Systems FMECA
All the analyzed components and some of the failure modes considered most important for this
analysis are identified and assigned an identification number in Tab. 6.1. The corresponding
FMECA sheets are given in Appendix B.1.
The criticality is divided into three different classes in the analysis:
• P: Production loss
• E: Environmental impact
• S: Safety of personnel
For each of the consequence classes the criticality is ranked with different colors, green meaning
acceptable risk, yellow meaning tolerable risk and red meaning critical risk.
Most of the components within the BOP control functions are assigned with an acceptable
criticality level, mainly as a result of redundancy. A failure occurring on one of the pods should
lead to retrievement of the system, however, the production loss class is still marked acceptable
for such components, because the pods will not be retrieved until next scheduled maintenance.
Component failures considered most critical for the sub-system are the CCU, pod selector valve
and shuttle valve. A CCU failure has the option of acoustic back-up control or ROV, to operate
the BOP. Failures in the pod selector valve or shuttle valve are both marked critical, because a
failure in either of these would lead to loss of control of the BOP.
For components within the power supply sub function, are the subsea accumulators, fluid
reservoir, hydraulic lines on the BOP stack and hydraulic line from HPU to BOP, all considered
most critical in the system. A failure in the subsea accumulator would not directly lead to loss of
control because of redundant bottles and overcharging, however a potentially dangerous situa-
tion could occur. A reservoir with low fluid levels is dangerous for personnel, but also easier to
detect compared to failures on the sea bottom. The potential of hydraulic lines failing to deliver
hydraulics are dangerous, however increased storage in the accumulators and pod redundancy
limits the potential risk.
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6.2 Fault Tree Analysis
6.2.1 Theory Behind Approach
Relationship to Safety Instrumented Functions
Before quantifying the reliability of a subsea BOP control system, linking it against a well know
regulatory requirement, based on probabilistic formulas, is most ideal. As a result, better un-
derstandability and verification of the system can be achieved. An example of such a system is
the safety integrity level (SIL), defined below.
Z SIL: Discrete level (one out of four) for specifying the safety integrity requirements of the
safety instrumented functions to be allocated to the safety instrumented systems (IEC-61511,
2011).
Applying SIL to the subsea BOP control system requires compliance with the definition of
safety-instrumented systems (SIS), which governs one or more safety instrumented functions
(SIFs). The SIS consists of at least three subsystems, sensors(s), logic solver(s) and final ele-
ment(s) (Rausand, 2014). Categorizing the subsea BOP control system underneath the SIS def-
inition can to some degree be considered accurate. However, a SIS is mainly intended for ded-
icated safety systems that automatically respond to a process demand through the use of SIFs.
The BOP system does not respond to process demands automatically, but relies on personnel’s
knowledge and physical interaction to activate such functions. Also, the BOP functions are part
of the normal operation, and not only dedicated to the role as safety barrier, like the SIS (Klakegg,
2012). Applying the SIS definition directly to the subsea BOP control system can therefore not
be done.
Despite inaccuracies between the BOP systems and the SIS definition, is the BOP reliabil-
ity commented in SIL methodology in NOG - 070 (2004) (mentioned shortly in chapter 4.2.3).
NOG-070 recommends that the required PFD/SIL level for each well should be calculated, and
tolerable risk levels be set as part of the application process for consent to exploration and devel-
opment drilling. A SIL 2 requirement is set for both isolation of the well and closing of the blind
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shear ram. Worth noticing is that no recommendations has been given to the actual shearing of
the pipe (Klakegg, 2012).
Systems within SIS terminology can be divided into two groups related to operation, con-
tinuous/high demand mode, or low demand mode. Continuous/high demand is calculated
through the average probability of dangerous failures per hour (PFH), while low demand mode,
uses the average probability failure on demand (PFD). The system in question must be calcu-
lated using one of these methods, to comply with SIL levels. IEC-61508 (2005) states that the
BOP should be considered as operating in a low demand mode of operation, meaning the BOP
system should be expressed by the average PFD of the SIF.
Model Selection
To quantify the PFD for the functions in the subsea BOP control system, a reliability analysis
method must be applied. Several different methods are available, and in Rausand (2014), seven
different approaches are recommended. IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 suggest for this type of analy-
sis either fault tree analysis (FTA), reliability block diagrams (RBD), or Markov methods, should
be applied. The CCF contribution must also be accounted for in the analysis. Lundteigen and
Rausand (2009) recommend the use of FTA or RBD for complex systems, such as the subsea BOP
control system.
FTA modeling focuses on the failure of a function, rather than the achievement of one.
The FTA model makes it easier to identify failures that are not directly linked to a component
function, and is considered intuitive and structured compared to RBD and Markov methods
(Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009).
RBD models often resemble the physical structure of the system, because of the similarities
between the block sequencing and the systems activation of components. Modeling of the RBD
is based on how functions are achieved, rather than the failure of it, as in FTA. Lundteigen and
Rausand (2009) describe this as a possible strength, but also a weakness, because functions in-
stalled (or should be installed) to protect the main system function may easily be forgotten. As
opposed to the physical structure, the RBD may include the same component in different sec-
tions of the model, if the component is part of several functions. This may confuse personnel
unfamiliar with reliability modeling (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009).
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The Markov methods have the ability to model systems who frequently switch between dif-
ferent operational modes, and can be used to analyze repairable systems with complex repair
strategies (Rausand and Høyland, 2004). However, the number of system states increases expo-
nentially with the number of components, making systems with moderate complexity difficult
to comprehend (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009).
The subsea BOP control system is a large and complex system, considering both design and
operations and maintenance. The frequency of different operational situations is relatively low,
making the Markov methods less suitable. RBDs can be a sufficient tool for modeling parts of
the system, for example, when reviewing the effect of redundancy in different operational situ-
ations (Klakegg, 2012). When conducting reviews of the system, close involvement with design
engineers and operators are extremely important. The FTA provides an intuitive and structured
analysis on the whole system, based on the potential failures. It has a structured design and
is easy to understand for personnel without a reliability background. Based on this, the FTA is
preferred for the reliability assessment of the subsea BOP control system.
6.2.2 Fault Tree Analysis of the Subsea BOP Control System
Conservative PFD approximation
Analyses previously discussed in the report have all used FTA programs to calculate the PFD of
the systems. The calculations are in most cases influenced by lack of data, causing approxima-
tions to be made. Approximations used must be conservative, so that the "actual" PFD is lower
than the one calculated (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009). Studies such as Holand and Awan
(2012) and Holand (1999), uses the FTA software tool Cara FaultTree to model and calculate the
top event probabilities. The programs weakness, along with other similar FTA programs, is that
it produces non-conservative values, meaning inaccurate PFD approximations (Lundteigen and
Rausand, 2009).
In Lundteigen and Rausand (2009), an alternative approach for producing non-conservative
and more accurate estimates of the PFD is presented. The approach is based on post-processing
minimal cut sets, and has the ability to include CCFs. Further it will be shown how the approach
presented by Lundteigen and Rausand (2009) can be applied to produce conservative PFD esti-
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mates, including CCFs, for the subsea BOP control system.
Consider a fault tree for a specified TOP event, constructed and identified with m minimal
cut sets {MC1, MC2, ..., MCm}. Let PDF j ,i denote the (average) PFD of a component i in minimal
cut set j, for j = 1,2,...,m. Minimal cut j of order m j is a 1−out−o f −m j voted structure, and only
fails ones all m j components are in a failed state, at the same time. When all components are
independent in the minimal j, the PFD of the minimal cut is normally calculated by (Lundteigen
and Rausand, 2009):
PF DMC j ≈
m j∏
i=1
PF D j ,i (6.1)
Several software tools uses (6.1), including Cara FaultTree, for calculating the PFD of a minimal
cut, however, the result is not accurate (Dutuit et al., 2008). Due to the well known Schwartz’ in-
equality saying that "the average of a product is not equal to the product of averages" (Lundteigen
and Rausand, 2009). Equation 6.1 is therefore categorized as a non-conservative approximation.
The average PF D j ,i , for a single component i in minimal cut j, periodically tested and has a
constant DU failure rate, can be calculated as (Rausand and Høyland, 2004):
PF D j ,i = 1
τ
∫ τ
0
(1−exp(−λDU , j ,i · t ))d t ≈
λDU , j ,i ·τ
2
(6.2)
Equation 6.2 gives a conservative PFD approximation, and is considered to produce ade-
quate results when (Rausand and Høyland, 2004):
• λDU , j ,i ·τ < 10−2 Approximation might be to conservative for higher values (Lundteigen
and Rausand, 2009).
• Detection of a DU failure stops the operation and is not resumed until the failure has been
repaired.
• The functional test is perfect, meaning, all DU failures are revealed during testing.
The subsea BOP control system fulfills the two first conditions; the third is not fully obtained
because of the shear ram. A perfect test cannot be conducted on the shear ram, only an imper-
fect functional test can be performed. To account for this, the term proof test coverage factor
(PTC) is introduced in Rausand (2014).
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Including the PTC when calculating the PF DMC j accounts for the fraction (1-PTC) of all
DU-failures that are left unrevealed after the function test. Failures left undetected by weekly
functional tests, can normally not be revealed until the systems gets a complete overhaul (τ˜).
For a single channel, such as the shear ram, the PFD for the component failure mode will be
(Rausand, 2014):
PF Dav g ≈ PTC ·λDUτ
2
+ (1−PTC )λDU τ˜
2
(6.3)
Rausand (2014) makes references to studies based on SINTEF reports, showing the PTC has
a high order of magnitude on the systems. Therefore, it is argued that the PTC shall be included
in the PFD calculation for the subsea BOP control system, for components exposed to such
failures.
The PF DMC j for a minimal cut j with m j independent components and a test interval τ, can
be expressed as following (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009):
PF DMC j =
1
τ
∫ τ
0
m j∏
i=1
(1−exp(−λDU , j ,i · t ))d t
≤ 1
τ
∫ τ
0
m j∏
i=1
(λDU , j ,i · t )d t
=
(∏m j
i=1λDU , j ,i
)
·τm j
m j +1
=
(
λ¯DU , j ·τ
)
m j +1
(6.4)
where
λ¯DU , j =
(m j∏
i=1
λDU , j ,i
) 1
m j
(6.5)
is the geometric mean of the m j failure rates, in the minimal cut j.
To better compare the conservative with non-conservative approximations, a minimal cut
j consisting of two independent components with the same failure rate, λDU , j , is inserted into
the formulas. Combining (6.1) and (6.2) gives PF DMC j = (λDU , j · τ)2/4. While inserting the
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failure rates into (6.4) gives PF DMC j = (λDU , jτ)2/3, showing that the non-conservative is 25
% lower than the conservative. The percentage increases with the order m j , of minimal cut
sets. Meaning the result of the PFD approximations achieved in the FTA tools calculations can
be greatly improved by post-processing the minimal cut sets using the approach presented in
Lundteigen and Rausand (2009).
Fault Tree Development
Development of the fault tree should ideally be done in close cooperation with design engineers
and operators of the BOP system. This type of personnel has not been available when writing
the report, but input from experienced personnel at SINTEF has strengthened the analysis. Still,
it should be noted that due to limited experience with the system, critical failures might have
been overlooked or incorrectly included in the fault tree.
The scope of the analysis starts after the push button has been activated, and ends when the
shear ram is activated. Meaning human factors and the shearing ability of the shear ram is not
considered.
The TOP event in the FTA relates to the control system’s ability to close the shear ram upon
request. The fault trees can be found in Appendix C.1 and the corresponding basic events are
listed in Appendix C.2. The failure rates for the basic events are mostly based on Holand and
Awan (2012) and Håbrekke et al. (2013), with a few exceptions where "expert judgment" has
been used.
Minimal Cut Sets
The minimal cut sets of the fault tree are generated by the Cara FaultTree program. All orders
of the cut sets are considered due to the potential contribution from the beta-factor. However,
the highest order of cut sets is 4. All the minimal cut sets are imported into Excel for further
calculation, and can be found in Appendix C.3.
Identification of Common Cause Component Groups
For each minimal cut set MC j , it must be determined whether the components are dependent
or independent. This is done by looking for common root causes and coupling factors in each of
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the minimal cut sets (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009). Components in the subsea BOP control
system that are dependent and share the same common failure cause, are included in the same
common cause component group CG j ,v , for j = 1,2, ...,m and v = 1,2, ...,r j , where r j is the
number of different common cause component groups in minimal cut MC j (Lundteigen and
Rausand, 2009). In cases where a minimal cut set contains a single common cause component
group, the index v may be omitted from the notation. Each CG j ,v is assigned a corresponding
beta factor, β j ,v .
The identified common cause groups in the events are marked in bold in the table for the
minimal cut sets, found in Appendix C.3. Cut sets where identical components in different sys-
tems are marked as common cause, is a result of exposure to failures such as similar design and
material, same power line and/or prone to same stressors such as temperature, vibration and
pressure. Other common cause groups are mainly a result of common electric and/or hydraulic
source.
Quantifying β j ,v for CG j ,v
Preferably the β-values should be quantified using plant specific conditions, applying specially
developed checklists (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009). Due to somewhat limited knowledge
about the subsea BOP control system, the preferred approach is a combination of finding data
in the NOG - 070 (2004) and expert judgment. β-values for the SEMs and PLCs are found in the
NOG - 070 (2004), while the rest of the values are based on expert judgment. The β-values are
listed in Tab. 6.2.
PFD Calculations
PFD calculation of the system is performed based on the generated minimal cut sets and the
identified common cause component groups. The methods for calculating the different mini-
mal cut sets in the subsea BOP control system are based on theory presented in Lundteigen and
Rausand (2009).
Calculating the PF DMC j is influenced by the following (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009):
1. The order m j of the minimal cut
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Table 6.2: β-factor values
CCF component
groups (CG)
CCF components groups Beta-factor
CG 1 PBDCP,PBTCP 10 %
CG 2 HSLA,LPA 10 %
CG 3 EEPFY,EEPFB 10 %
CG 4 PMAIVY,PMAIVB 10 %
CG 5 SVSOPY,SVSOPB 10 %
CG 6 BPF,YPF 10 %
CG 7 MUXB,MUXY 10 %
CG 8 LSMAV,ELSA 10 %
CG 9 SEMAB,SEMBB 5 %
CG 10 SEMAY,SEMBY 5 %
CG 11 PLCAB,PLCBB 1 %
CG 12 PLCAY,PLCBY 1 %
2. Whether or not the components of the minimal cut are identical
3. Whether or not the components of the minimal cut are dependent
4. Whether or not the components of the minimal cut are tested simultaneously
The analysis considers all orders of cut sets, but only cut sets to the order 4 were generated
by the analysis. In chapter 4 it was stated that the pods should be tested every 14 day, meaning,
one pod was tested every 7 day. However, the reliability data applied in the analysis is for testing
every 7 day. Therefore, it is presumed that all components in the system are tested simultane-
ously.
Minimal cut sets with only independent components are calculated using (6.4) and (6.5),
directly.
Considering minimal cut j, where the components are identical and dependent, the PF DMC j
can be calculated from (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009):
PF DMC j ≈
((
1−β j
)
λDU , j ·τ
)m j
m j +1
+ β jλDU , j ·τ
2
(6.6)
Components in a minimal cut set that are non-identical, can still be exposed to the same
CCF, such as vibrations, temperature increase or pressure increase. Lundteigen and Rausand
(2009) state that this must be cared for when applying the beta factor model for calculating
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PLCAY
PLCBY
C1
CG12
PLCAB
PLCBB
C2
CG11
Figure 6.1: Minimal cut 115, with two common cause component groups
the CCFs contribution. To overcome the problem, Lundteigen and Rausand (2009) purpose to
define the beta-factor to be a fraction of the lowest component failure rate, as this rate limits
how often components fails simultaneously in a parallel structure.
The PF DMC j for a minimal cut with dependent, non-identical components all belonging to
the same common cause component group, based on this approach, becomes (Lundteigen and
Rausand, 2009):
PF DMC j ≈
[
(1−β j )λ¯DU , j ·τ
]m j
m j +1
+β j ·λminDU , j ·
τ
2
(6.7)
where
λminDU , j =min{λDU , j ,i } (6.8)
is the lowest DU failure rate in MC j
For minimal cut sets consisting of more than one common cause component group, or in-
cludes both independent and dependent components, (6.6) or (6.7) cannot be applied. This
situation, with a basis in the analysis, is illustrated in Fig. 6.1, showing the minimal cut set with
two common cause component groups, CG 11 and CG 12, each with two components. The CCFs
CHAPTER 6. ANALYSIS 55
(C1 and C2) are included as "virtual" components, in series with the parallel structure.
The remaning components in the MC j , are the independent components, marked H j (Lundteigen
and Rausand, 2009). The order of H j is denoted by k
(I )
j , and the order of CG j ,v by k
(C )
j ,v (Lundteigen
and Rausand, 2009). Components in H j have failure rates λ
(I )
DU ,i for i = 1,2, ...,k(C )j ,v and the com-
ponents in CG j ,v haveλ j ,v,l for v = 1,2, ...,r j and l = 1,2, ...,k(C )j ,v (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009).
For the minimal cut in Fig. 6.2, k(I ) = 0, r = 2, k(C )1 = 2 and k(C )2 = 2.
Following the approach from Lundteigen and Rausand (2009), the PF DMC j of the virtual
cut set with the lowest order in a minimal cut set, containing more than one common cause
component group and/or both dependent and independent components, can be expressed as
following:
PF D (I )MC j ≈
(∏k(I )j
i=1λ
(I )
j ,i ·
∏r j
v=1β j ,v ·λmin,vDU , j
)
τ
k(I )j r j
k(I )j + r j +1
(6.9)
where λmin,vDU , j is the lowest failure rate in CG j ,v in minimal cut MC j .
To better understand (6.9), an example of the MC 115, shown in Fig. 6.1, can be applied. The
minimal cut sets consists of the following virtual cuts: {C1, C2}, {C1, PLCAB, PLCBB}, {C2, PLCAY,
PLCBY} and {PLCAB, PLCBB, PLCAY, PLCBY}. In this example, the failure rate and β-factor is the
same for all the components, making it easier to simplify the equations. {C1, C2} has the lowest
order, and the following values can be determined: k(I ) = 0, r = 2, k(C )1 = 2 and k(C )2 = 2, the PFD
for the cut is then:
PF D (1)MC ≈
β2λ2DU ·τ2
3
(6.10)
The PFD for the remaning cut sets are found using the same method as above, based on the
approach in Lundteigen and Rausand (2009).
PF D2MC = PF D3MC ≈
(1−β)2λ2DUβλDU ·τ3
4
(6.11)
PF D4MC ≈
(1−β)2λ2DU (1−β)2λ2DU ·τ4
5
(6.12)
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This approach is used for calculating cut sets consisting of both several common cause com-
ponents and for cut sets consisting of both common cause components and independent com-
ponents, in the subsea BOP control system.
Calculation of the PF DMC j of a minimal cut j, can be done using the "upper bound approx-
imation" (Lundteigen and Rausand, 2009).
PF DMC j ≈ 1−
n∏
i=1
(
1−PF D (k)MC j
)
(6.13)
where n is the number of virtual cuts in MC j
Calculate system PF DSI F
The PF DSI F for the top event is calculated in Appendix C.3 using (6.14), meaning the probability
that the subsea BOP control system is unable to activate the shear ram upon demand. The PFD
for each of the minimal cut sets have been calculated using Excel and applying the formulas
described earlier.
PF DSI F ≈ 1−
m∏
j=1
(
1−PF DMC j
)
(6.14)
Discussion
The calculated PF DSI F using conservative values and considering the contribution from CCF is
approximately 7.66·10−4, the calculations generated by Cara FaultTree, gives a value of 4.15·10−4.
Meaning, the manually calculated result is almost doubled compared to Cara FaultTree.
The calculations show the biggest contribution comes from a variety of different compo-
nents, such as the shuttle valve, manifold regulator and different electric failures. The solenoid
valves, PLCs and SEMs have much smaller contributions, and can almost be neglected from the
calculations. Comparing the result to other reports such as Holand and Awan (2012) is difficult,
older reports are based on the entire BOP system, while in this analysis the focus lies only within
the control system, and the corresponding components.
The results clearly show the importance of using conservative PFD approximations. For cut
sets consisting of one or more components, the PF DMC j has significantly increased, using the
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methods described in Lundteigen and Rausand (2009). The contribution from the CCFs is also
substantial. However, the biggest influence is mainly on cut sets consisting of components with
low failure rates, hence having a relativity small impact on the system.
6.3 Event Tree
Introduction
The fault tree model provides a "static" picture of the system during a specified time in a spec-
ified condition. It shows numerous paths consisting of different events, potentially leading to
system failures. The weakness in an FTA is that the sequence of the events does not affect the
analysis.
An event tree analysis (ETA) provides a more "dynamic" model of the system. The event tree
is a logic tree diagram; it starts with an initiating event (e.g., a kick) and provides a systematic
coverage of the time sequence of event propagation to its potential outcomes or consequences
(e.g., a blowout) (Rausand and Høyland, 2004). In this section, a brief discussion is made about
how an ETA can strengthen the reliability assessment of the subsea BOP control system
Event Tree Analysis on Crucial Systems
The ETA method is a great supplement for gaining a wider perspective of the risk picture and
potentially dangerous situations escalating during well control. However, conducting a full ETA
on a system is both time consuming and often requires new elements in well control to be in-
cluded, for example, the mud column. Therefore, only a small part of the subsea BOP control
system is considered to highlight the shortcomings of the FTA.
A simplified event tree of a shear ram activation is shown in Fig. 6.2. The ETA considers the
potential outcome of a failed pod activation, and the time duration before the redundant pod is
activated (unless that one also fails to activate). The duration of time from blue pod activation
and yellow pod activation, is marked x. This event takes approximately 2-3 minutes, and will
have a direct influence on the consequence. However, this is not possible to model in a fault
tree.
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Closing shear
ram
Push button
cannot activate
Blue pod
cannot activate
Yellow pod
cannot activate
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
time
x number of
minutes
Shear ram activated
Shear ram activated
Shear ram not activated
Shear ram not activated
Figure 6.2: Event tree of pod activation
Applying ETA on specific parts of the system will strengthen the analysis, however, it is both
time consuming and requires the scope of the analysis to be substantially widen.
Chapter 7
Summary and Recommendations for
Further Work
7.1 Summary and Conclusions
The Macondo accident reports identified the BOP and its control system as main causes of the
accident. As a consequence of this accident, improved methods for BOP reliability assessments
are now required.
Several reliability assessment studies are discussed in this report, and all of these points to
the subsea BOP control system as the main contributor to critical BOP failures.
The relevant regulations and standards in Norway and the United States have been com-
pared as part of this study. They are rather similar, but there are also differences, especially when
it comes to specificity. PSA gives requirements on a general level, whereas BSEE provides much
more specific details with regards to equipment and personnel. Regarding standards, NORSOK
D-001 mostly contains the same requirements as API 53 and API spec 16D, but differences such
as BOP activation required from three different places, and all electrical equipment is required
to be EX-proof and have access to a UPS, could be found.
To identify potentially critical failures in the subsea BOP control system a detailed FMECA
has been performed, and revealed that the shuttle valve, the pod selector valve, the subsea ac-
cumulators and the fluid reservoir were the most safety critical components in the system.
The potential contribution from CCFs was examined and found relevant for the analysis of
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the control system.
To improve current reliability assessments methods of the subsea BOP control system, a
thorough review of both the system and previously used methods was required. Relevant failure
modes and potential failures were identified using the FTA. To improve reliability calculations, a
method based on post-processing of the minimal cut sets generated in the FTA, was purposed.
The method gave a more conservative and accurate approximation, and the calculated result
almost doubled, compared to the conventional method. The contribution from CCFs was also
implemented.
The ETA was performed to cover the switching phases between the two pods, showing the
time dependencies that can influence the consequences. This type of switching cannot be mod-
eled in the fault tree, therefore, recommendations to apply the ETA to similar situations to get a
more accurate reliability estimate is given.
For components such as the shear ram, a perfect function test cannot be performed. In the
analysis, no such components are evaluated. However, in an expanded analysis of the subsea
BOP control system, such components will be involved, therefore, it is recommended to add the
contribution from PTC to components with imperfect testing.
7.2 Discussion
Neglecting human factors from the analysis is not ideal, in the event of a kick, an essential part of
the operation is for humans to detected and act, before the control system takes over. Ignoring
the human factors makes the result in the analysis some what degraded, however, modeling and
quantification of human factors can be difficult. The effects of human factors in well integrity
are discussed in Vignes (2011).
The majority of data used in the calculations may be outdated, as a result of limited access
to updated data. The preliminary results from an ongoing SINTEF study shows a significantly
higher beta-value compared to old reports. The old values are based on detection of dangerous
detected failures by using diagnostic tests; however, in the analysis only DU-failures are consid-
ered. A higher contribution from the beta-factors can therefore be argued for.
The transition between pods is not fully accounted for in the analysis. In Rausand and Høy-
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land (2004) the term imperfect switching is introduced, where the probability of switching be-
tween two redundant components is quantified. This contribution is not present in the analysis,
and may have an impact on the calculations.
7.3 Recommendations for Further Work
The study is carried out within a limited period of time and recommendations to explore the
conclusions of this report further, is given. Recommended tasks for making better conclusions
are described below.
7.3.1 Proof Test Coverage
In an expanded analysis of a subsea BOP, components prone to imperfect tests are likely to be
included. Calculating the PFD contribution from these components using the same methods
applied for components with perfect proof tests will be wrong. Therefore, recommendations
are given to add the contribution from the proof test coverage factor, for such components.
7.3.2 Event Tree Model
To strengthen the reliability analysis for the subsea BOP control system, it is recommended to
expand the scope of the analysis and include event tree modeling.
7.3.3 Common Cause Failures
Performing a deeper analysis on potential common cause failures in the subsea BOP control
system could expose more components prone to common cause failures, and strengthen the
analysis.
7.3.4 Three Pods
Cameron has a control system containing three pods. A comparison between the conventional
two pod system and the three pod system could provide useful knowledge about advantages and
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disadvantages between the systems, and give recommendations to future subsea BOP control
systems.
Appendix A
Acronyms
API American Petroleum Institute
BOP Blowout Preventer
BSEE The Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement
CCF Common Cause Failure
CCU Central Control Unit
DCP Driller’s Control Panel
DU Dangerous Undetected
DWH Deepwater Horizon
EX Explosion
FMECA Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis
FTA Fault Tree Analysis
GOM Gulf of Mexico
HAZID Hazard Identification
HAZOP Hazard and Operability
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HPU Hydraulic Power Unit
ID Inner Diameter
LMRP Lower Marine Riser Package
MTTF Mean time to failure
MUX Multiplex
NCS Norwegian Continental Shelf
NOG Norwegian Oil and Gas Association
PFD Probability of Failure on Demand
PFH Probability of Dangerous Failures per Hour
PLC Programmable Logical Controller
PSA Petroleum Safety Authority Norway
PTC Proof Test Coverage
RAMS Reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety
RBD Reliability Block Diagram
ROV Remotely Operated Vehicle
SEM Subsea Electronic Module
SIF Safety Integrity Function
SIL Safety Integrity Level
SIS Safety Instrumented System
STM Subsea Transducer Module
SV Solenoid Valve
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TCP Toolpusher’s Control Panel
UPS Uninterruptible Power Supply
U.S. United States
Appendix B
FMECA Sheets
B.1 FMECA
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Component Function
Operational
mode Failure mode
Failure cause or 
mechanism
Detection of 
failure
On the 
subsystem
On the system
function
Risk reducing 
measures/ safeguard
Eect of  failure
Description
of failureDescription of unit
Power supply
unit 
(topside)
Deliver
power to 
el. panels
and CCU
Avaliable
at all times
Transmission
failure
Erratic output
Failed electrical
cable No direct eect,
because of
safeguard
Control
panels
(topside)
Sends
activation
signals to
CCU
Avaliable
at all times
Electric  failure
Failure in MUX
cable
Testing/
operation
Pods will
not recieve
activation
signal
Pods wil
not activate, 
use secondary
control system
to activate BOP
Frequent testing 
and inspection.
Redundancy:
Have at least two 
separate panels
Electric
power from 
back-up
battery
Deliver
power to
el. panels
and CCU
as back-up
Insucient
power
Failed electrical
cable Testing/
operation
No direct  eect,
because of 
redundancy
Maintenace/ 
operational routines.
Redundancy:
Main power is the 
primary source of 
power
Batteries in
pods
Enable pods
to convert
el. signals
to hydraulic
Thermal variations Maintenance/ 
operational routines.
Redundancy:
Batterie in other pod
and acoustic
back-up system
Solenoid 
valves would
not function
Rams could not
be activated in
an emergency 
Comp.
No
1.1
F-
1.1.1
F-
1.1.2
Mechanical/
electrical failure
Testing/
operation
No direct 
eect
No electrical
output
Frequent testing.
Redundancy: 
Back-up battery
1.2 F-
1.2.1
Erratic output
1.3 Standby
F-
1.3.1
Battery empty
No direct 
eect
1.4
Avaliable
at all times
F-
1.4.1
Insucient
power Corrosion
Obsolete battery
Testing/
operation
1.5 MUX cable
reel
Transefer 
electric
 comm.
signals from
CCU to
subsea pod
Avaliable
at all times
F-
1.5.1
Transmission
failure
Worn cable
Short circuit
No signal sent
from electric panel
Testing/
operation
Not able to
initiate BOP 
functions
Commands from
control panels
cannot initiate
BOP functions
Maintenance/
operational routines.
Redundancy:
Other MUX cable
can be applied
Sub-function 1: BOP control functions
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Component Function
Operational
mode Failure mode
Failure cause or 
mechanism
Detection of 
failure
On the 
subsystem
On the system
function
Risk reducing 
measures/ safeguard
Eect of  failure
Description
of failureDescription of unit
CCU
Send/recieve
comm.
signals
Monitoring
Avaliable
at all times
Control/signal
failure
Erratic output
Mechanical/
electrical failure
BOP functions
will not be 
activated
Pod 
selector 
valve
Deliver
power to
el. panels
and CCU
as back-up
Fail to move Monitoring
 of valve 
position
If failure in a pod
and trying to route
hydraulic uid
away from it,
no BOP function
will be executed.
Maintenace/ 
operational routines.
Regulary testing
Blue/
Yellow
pods
Direct
hydraulic
uid and
operate the
BOP
SEM does 
not work Frequent testing, 
change damaged 
parts during
maintenance,
always have a pod
working
BOP will not 
activate, use
dierent pod 
Comp.
No P
1.6
F-
1.6.1
F-
1.6.2
Mechanical/
electrical failure.
Testing/
operation
Routing failure
of electrical
signals
Frequent testing.
Redundancy: 
ROV operation
 and
acoustic back-up
control system
1.7
F-
1.7.1
Hyraulic uid
wrongly routed
1.8 Avaliable
at all times
F-
1.8.1
Unable to 
deliver 
hydraulic 
power
High pressure 
valve does
 not open
Solenoid valve
do not activate
Testing/
operation
1.9
Solenoid
valve
Convert
electrical 
signals
into
hydraulics
Avaliable
at all times
F-
1.9.1
Fail to 
move Obstruction
Corrosion
Testing/
operation
Can no longer
operate the
solenoid valves
from control
panel
Still possible to 
operate the BOP
functions 
manually
Maintenance/
operational routines.
Regulary function
testing of the BOP
F-
1.6.3
F-
1.6.4
Fail to 
function
on demand
Spurious 
activation
Mechanical/
electrical failure.
Worn cables
Mechanical/
electrical failure.
Worn cables
Routing failure
of electrical
signals
No signal
output
Routing failure
of electrical
signals
Avaliable
at all times
Mechanical
 failure
Obstruction
Corrosion
Mechanical/
electrical failure.
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Component Function
Operational
mode Failure mode
Failure cause or 
mechanism
Detection of 
failure
On the 
subsystem
On the system
function
Risk reducing 
measures/ safeguard
Eect of  failure
Description
of failureDescription of unit
SPM
valve
Avaliable
at all times
Shuttle
valve
Transfer 
hydraulics
to BOP
functions
Fail to move
Monitoring
 of valve 
position
Redundancy
on shear rams
will be lost, worst
case no
shearing
Maintenace/ 
operational routines.
Regular function
 testing of
BOP
Choke
and kill
valve
Testing
BOP
functions
(Well killing
is outside
scope)
Mechanical
failure, corrosion,
plugged line Redundancy:
Other ckoke 
and kill valve
No mediate
eect, because
of redundancy 
Comp.
No P
1.10
F-
1.10.1
Monitoring
using
owmeter
and
pressure
transmitter.
Testing/
operation
1.11 F-
1.11.1
Shuttle valve
cannot move
1.12
Avaliable
at all times
F-
1.12.1
Fail to
open/close
Worn/degraded
parts
Monitoring/
Testing
procedures
Fail to
open/close.
Fail between
positions
Mechanical
failure, stuck,
corrosion,
worn/ degraded
parts,
hydraulic
leakage.
No mediate
eect, because
of redundant
SPM valves
Avaliable
at all times
Mechanical
 failure
Corrosion,
due to exposure
Convert
electrical 
signals
into
hydraulics
SPM valve
will not open/
close, will
cause delay
in the hydraulic
 system
Maintenace/ 
operational routines.
Regulary testing.
Redundancy:
Have redundant
SPM valve
External
leakage
Internal
leakage Worn/degraded
parts
Unable to 
perform testing
as planned 
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Component Function
Operational
mode Failure mode
Failure cause or 
mechanism
Detection of 
failure
On the 
subsystem
On the system
function
Risk reducing 
measures/ safeguard
Eect of  failure
Description
of failureDescription of unit
Subsea
accu-
mulators
Avaliable
at all times
Fluid
reservoir
Store 
hydraulic 
uid,
provide 
high 
pressure
to BOP
functions
Reservoir cover
degraded, 
causing the
reservoir to be
contaminated by
dirt
Installing stainers
will reduce number
of large particles.
Pumps clogging.
Fine particles
passing through, 
causing wear on
pumps 
Comp.
No P
2.1
F-
2.1.1
Regular
testing  of
BOP
functions
2.2
Avaliable
at all times
F-
2.2.1
Failure in level
transmitter.
Capacity of 
reservoir is
to small
Maintenace
procedured/
Sampling
of uid to
operations 
Internal
leakage
Mechanical
damage.
Poor quality
on accumulator
valve
No mediate
eect, because
of redundancy.
BOP functions
will work because
of overcapacity
Accumulator
capacity is 
reduced/
lack of pressure/
does not 
function
Regular function
test of BOP
functions and
leak testing.
Redundancy:
Bottles are 
charged more
than what is
needed.
Containment
of reservoir
Too small
or clogged
went on
the hydraulic
reservoir
Fluid quality
is degraded,
damages
valves 
Sub-function 2: Power Supply
Burst bladder
F-
2.1.1
Wear due to 
aging.
Damage on
valve in bottom
of baldder
Lack of 
pressure/
Gas in system/
Aected 
bladder will not 
function
Som reduced 
capacity.
BOP functions
will work because
of overcapacity.
Particles from
bursted baldder
can enter the
 hydraulic system
Deliver
hydraulic
uid Too low
volumetric
capacity
Reservoir
plugged
F-
2.2.2
F-
2.2.3
Visual 
inspection.
Level
transmitter 
Visual 
inspection.
Level
transmitter 
Empty tank or
overown if
more uid is in
the system, 
than capacity 
Leakage
of hydraulic
uid 
Potentail spilling
uid to the 
environment
No mediate
eect, because
of safeguards
Maintenance/
operational routines.
Low level alarm.
Environmently
friendly uid
Accumulators
store enough 
energy to 
secure BOP
operations
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Component Function
Operational
mode Failure mode
Failure cause or 
mechanism
Detection of 
failure
On the 
subsystem
On the system
function
Risk reducing 
measures/ safeguard
Eect of  failure
Description
of failureDescription of unit
HPU
Deliver
hydraulics
Avaliable
at all times
Hydraulic
pump
failure
Mechanical/
electrical failure System will still
function because
of redundancy
Hydraulic
line from
HPU to
BOP
Plugged/
choked line
Pumps 
running
excessivly
Alarm
indication
Visual
inspection
Potential loss
of individual
BOP functions
Maintenace/ 
operational routines.
Low level alarms
Environmental
uid
Regulator
valve
Regulate
hydraulics
Mechanical/
electrical failure
Corrosion
Failure in
solenoid valve
No direct 
qonsequence due
to redundancy
Comp.
No P
2.3
F-
2.3.1
Pumps are
monitored
with alarms
Pumps are 
not running
Maintenance/
operational routines
Redundancy:
Extra pumps
and accumulator
banks
2.4
F-
2.4.1
Spill to 
environment
2.5 Avaliable
at all times
F-
2.5.1
Fail to
move
Testing/
operation/
pressure
trasmitters
2.6
POD
isolation
valve
Avaliable
at all times
F-
2.6.1
Internal 
leakage
Testing/
operation
Unable to
perform BOP
functions
Leakage to the
environment
Monitoring of
valve, ow meter
and pressure
transmitters
Mechanical 
failure.
Contamination
of uid
External forces
Vibration
Failure  in ttings
gaskets, etc.
Mechanical,
corrosion failure
Quality of 
electrical motor
in pump
Deliver
hydraulics
Avaliable
at all times
F-
2.4.2
F-
2.4.3
External
leakage
Internal
leakage
External forces
Vibration
Failure  in ttings
gaskets, etc.
Reduced uid
delivery
Reduced uid
delivery
Spill to 
environment
Loos all hydraulic
uid.
Loss of BOP 
functions
No qonsequence
because of
redundancy
Regulators
cannot be
operated from
panels
Maintenace/ 
operational routines.
Can me operated
manually or be 
bypassed
Regulate
hydraulics
2.7
Hydraulic
lines on
BOP
stack
Transfer
hydraulic
uid
Avaliable
at all times
F-
2.7.1
Internal 
leakage
Mechanical,
corrosion failure
Testing/
operation
Unable to
perform BOP
functions
Leakage to the
environment
Monitoring of
valve, ow meter
and pressure
transmitters
E S
Criticality
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C.2 Basic Events
The basic events for the fault tree are listed on the next page. Failure rates marked with green
been derived from Holand and Awan (2012). Those failure rates marked with red is derived from
Håbrekke et al. (2013), and those marked with yellow are "expert judgment"
APPENDIX C. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 78
Basic	  event	   Failure	  mode	  description	  
Failure	  rate	  
per	  day	  
Test	  intervall	  
(Days)	  
PBDCP	   DCP	  push	  button	  fails	   9.60E-­‐06	   7	  
EEPFB	   Electric	  or	  electronic	  pod	  failure,	  blue	  pod	   6.00E-­‐04	   7	  
EEPFY	   Electric	  or	  electronic	  pod	  failure,	  yellow	  pod	   6.00E-­‐04	   7	  
ELCLB	   External	  leakage	  in	  blue	  conduit	  line	  or	  associated	  equipment	   3.80E-­‐04	   7	  
ELSA	   External	  leakage	  in	  subsea	  accumulator	   6.70E-­‐05	   7	  
ELCLY	   External	  leakage	  in	  yellow	  conduit	  line	  or	  associated	  equipment	   3.80E-­‐04	   7	  
SPVCLB	   Fail	  to	  open	  surface	  pilot	  valve	  for	  blue	  conduit	  line	   3.00E-­‐04	   7	  
SPVCLY	   Fail	  to	  open	  surface	  pilot	  valve	  for	  yellow	  conduit	  line	   3.00E-­‐04	   7	  
MPVB	   Failed	  to	  open	  mounted	  pilot	  valve,	  blue	  pod	   5.00E-­‐04	   7	  
MPVY	   Failed	  to	  open	  mounted	  pilot	  valve,	  yellow	  pod	   5.00E-­‐04	   7	  
FCEEH	  
Failure	  to	  operate	  BOP	  from	  control	  system.	  Caused	  by	  
electronics,	  electric	  or	  hydraulic	  problems	   1.00E-­‐04	   7	  
BPF	   Function	  fails,	  blue	  pod	   2.00E-­‐05	   7	  
YPF	   Function	  fails,	  yellow	  pod	   2.00E-­‐05	   7	  
HLRCB	   Hydraulic	  leak	  that	  ruins	  the	  blue	  pod	  control	   2.30E-­‐04	   7	  
HLRCY	   Hydraulic	  leak	  that	  ruins	  yellow	  pod	  control	   2.30E-­‐04	   7	  
HSLA	   Leakage	  in	  hydraulic	  supply	  line	  to	  accumulator	   2.40E-­‐06	   7	  
PMAIVB	   Leakage	  in	  pod	  mounted	  accumulator	  isolation	  valve,	  blue	  pod	   5.00E-­‐05	   7	  
PMAIVY	  
Leakage	  in	  pod	  mounted	  accumulator	  isolation	  valve,	  yellow	  
pod	   5.00E-­‐05	   7	  
MUXB	   Loss	  of	  MUX	  power/	  communication,	  blue	  pod	   9.60E-­‐07	   7	  
MUXY	   Loss	  of	  MUX	  power/	  communication,	  yellow	  pod	   9.60E-­‐07	   7	  
LPA	   Low	  pressure	  in	  accumulator	   2.40E-­‐06	   7	  
MRBP	   Manifold	  regulator	  fails,	  blue	  pod	   1.20E-­‐03	   7	  
MRYP	   Manifold	  regulator	  fails,	  yellow	  pod	   1.20E-­‐03	   7	  
PLCAB	   PLC	  A	  failure,	  blue	  pod	   1.68E-­‐05	   7	  
PLCAY	   PLC	  A	  failure,	  yellow	  pod	   1.68E-­‐05	   7	  
PLCBB	   PLC	  B	  failure,	  blue	  pod	   1.68E-­‐05	   7	  
PLCBY	   PLC	  B	  failure,	  yellow	  pod	   1.68E-­‐05	   7	  
SEMAY	   SEM	  A,	  blue	  pod	  fails	   9.10E-­‐05	   7	  
SEMAB	   SEM	  A,	  yellow	  pod	  fails	   9.10E-­‐05	   7	  
SEMBB	   SEM	  B,	  blue	  pod	  fails	   9.10E-­‐05	   7	  
SEMBY	   SEM	  B,	  yellow	  pod	  fails	   9.10E-­‐05	   7	  
PSVL	   Severe	  leakage	  in	  pod	  selector	  valve	   2.08E-­‐07	   7	  
LSMAV	   Severe	  leakage	  through	  the	  stack	  mounted	  accumulator	  valve	   2.50E-­‐05	   7	  
SVLE	   Shuttle	  valve	  or	  line	  to	  preventer	  leaks	  external	   1.00E-­‐05	   7	  
SVSOPB	   Shuttle	  valve	  stuck	  in	  opposite	  position,	  blue	  pod	   1.67E-­‐07	   7	  
SVSOPY	   Shuttle	  valve	  stuck	  in	  opposite	  position,	  yellow	  pod	   1.67E-­‐07	   7	  
SCFOB	   Solenoid	  valve	  fails	  to	  open,	  blue	  pod	   3.84E-­‐06	   7	  
SVFOY	   Solenoid	  valve	  fails	  to	  open,	  yellow	  pod	   3.84E-­‐06	   7	  
PBTCP	   TCP	  push	  button	  fails	   9.60E-­‐06	   7	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C.3 Minimal Cut Sets
Cara FaultTree generated the minimal cut sets. The basic event marked in bold indicates a com-
mon cause component relationship. At the end of the table, the PF DSI F for the TOP event can
be found.
APPENDIX C. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 80
ID# Minimal#cuts#j#
Non1cons.#
PFD#
w/out#CCF#
Cons.#PFD#
w/out#CCF#
Cons#PFD#
w/#CCF# 11PFD#
MC#1# {FCEEH}## *# 3.50E*04# *# 0.9996500000000#
MC#2# {PSVL}## *# 7.28E*07# *# 0.9999992720000#
MC#3# {SVLE}## *# 3.50E*05# *# 0.9999650000000#
MC#4# {PBDCP,PBTCP}## 1.13E*09# 2.26E*09# 3.36E*06# 0.9999966381711#
MC#5# {HSLA,LPA}## 6.48E*07# 1.41E*10# 8.40E*07# 0.9999991598857#
MC#6# {SVFOY,SCFOB}## 1.81E*10# 3.61E*10# *# 0.9999999996387#
MC#7# {HLRCY,SCFOB}## 1.81E*10# 3.61E*10# *# 0.9999999996387#
MC#8# {EEPFY,SCFOB}## 2.82E*08# 5.64E*08# *# 0.9999999435520#
MC#9# {PMAIVY,SCFOB}## 2.35E*09# 4.70E*09# *# 0.9999999952968#
MC#10# {SVSOPY,SCFOB}## 7.84E*12# 1.57E*11# *# 0.9999999999843#
MC#11# {MRYP,SCFOB}## 5.64E*08# 1.13E*07# *# 0.9999998871040#
MC#12# {YPF,SCFOB}## 9.41E*10# 1.88E*09# *# 0.9999999981184#
MC#13# {MUXY,SCFOB}## 4.52E*11# 9.03E*11# *# 0.9999999999097#
MC#14# {SVFOY,HLRCB}## 1.08E*08# 2.16E*08# *# 0.9999999783616#
MC#15# {HLRCY,HLRCB}## 6.48E*07# 1.30E*06# *# 0.9999987039500#
MC#16# {EEPFY,HLRCB}## 1.69E*06# 3.38E*06# *# 0.9999966190000#
MC#17# {PMAIVY,HLRCB}## 1.41E*07# 2.82E*07# *# 0.9999997182951#
MC#18# {SVSOPY,HLRCB}## 4.70E*10# 9.39E*10# *# 0.9999999990606#
MC#19# {MRYP,HLRCB}## 3.38E*06# 6.76E*06# *# 0.9999932380000#
MC#20# {YPF,HLRCB}## 5.64E*08# 1.13E*07# *# 0.9999998873000#
MC#21# {MUXY,HLRCB}## 2.70E*09# 5.41E*09# *# 0.9999999945904#
MC#22# {SVFOY,EEPFB}## 2.82E*08# 5.64E*08# *# 0.9999999435520#
MC#23# {HLRCY,EEPFB}## 1.69E*06# 3.38E*06# *# 0.9999966190000#
MC#24# {EEPFY,EEPFB}## 4.41E*06# 8.82E*06# 2.17E*04# 0.9997828558000#
MC#25# {PMAIVY,EEPFB}## 3.67E*07# 7.35E*07# *# 0.9999992651176#
MC#26# {SVSOPY,EEPFB}## 1.23E*09# 2.45E*09# *# 0.9999999975495#
MC#27# {MRYP,EEPFB}## 8.82E*06# 1.76E*05# *# 0.9999823600000#
MC#28# {YPF,EEPFB}## 1.47E*07# 2.94E*07# *# 0.9999997060000#
MC#29# {MUXY,EEPFB}## 7.06E*09# 1.41E*08# *# 0.9999999858880#
MC#30# {SVFOY,PMAIVB}## 2.35E*09# 4.70E*09# *# 0.9999999952968#
MC#31# {HLRCY,PMAIVB}## 1.41E*07# 2.82E*07# *# 0.9999997182951#
MC#32# {EEPFY,PMAIVB}## 3.67E*07# 7.35E*07# *# 0.9999992651176#
MC#33# {PMAIVY,PMAIVB}## 3.06E*08# 6.12E*08# 1.75E*05# 0.9999824532034#
MC#34# {SVSOPY,PMAIVB}## 1.02E*10# 2.04E*10# *# 0.9999999997958#
MC#35# {MRYP,PMAIVB}## 7.35E*07# 1.47E*06# *# 0.9999985302352#
MC#36# {YPF,PMAIVB}## 1.22E*08# 2.45E*08# *# 0.9999999755039#
MC#37# {MUXY,PMAIVB}## 5.88E*10# 1.18E*09# *# 0.9999999988242#
MC#38# {SVFOY,SVSOPB}## 7.84E*12# 1.57E*11# *# 0.9999999999843#
MC#39# {HLRCY,SVSOPB}## 4.70E*10# 9.39E*10# *# 0.9999999990606#
MC#40# {EEPFY,SVSOPB}## 1.23E*09# 2.45E*09# *# 0.9999999975495#
MC#41# {PMAIVY,SVSOPB}## 1.02E*10# 2.04E*10# *# 0.9999999997958#
MC#42# {SVSOPY,SVSOPB}## 3.40E*13# 6.81E*13# 5.83E*08# 0.9999999416544#
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MC#43# {MRYP,SVSOPB}## 2.45E*09# 4.90E*09# *# 0.9999999950990#
MC#44# {YPF,SVSOPB}## 4.08E*11# 8.17E*11# *# 0.9999999999183#
MC#45# {MUXY,SVSOPB}## 1.96E*12# 3.92E*12# *# 0.9999999999961#
MC#46# {MRBP,SVFOY}## 5.64E*08# 1.13E*07# *# 0.9999998871040#
MC#47# {MRBP,HLRCY}## 3.38E*06# 6.76E*06# *# 0.9999932380000#
MC#48# {MRBP,EEPFY}## 8.82E*06# 1.76E*05# *# 0.9999823600000#
MC#49# {MRBP,PMAIVY}## 7.35E*07# 1.47E*06# *# 0.9999985302352#
MC#50# {MRBP,SVSOPY}## 2.45E*09# 4.90E*09# *# 0.9999999950990#
MC#51# {MRBP,MRYP}## 1.76E*05# 3.53E*05# *# 0.9999647200000#
MC#52# {MRBP,YPF}## 2.94E*07# 5.88E*07# *# 0.9999994120000#
MC#53# {MRBP,MUXY}## 1.41E*08# 2.82E*08# *# 0.9999999717760#
MC#54# {BPF,SVFOY}## 9.41E*10# 1.88E*09# *# 0.9999999981184#
MC#55# {BPF,HLRCY}## 5.64E*08# 1.13E*07# *# 0.9999998873000#
MC#56# {BPF,EEPFY}## 1.47E*07# 2.94E*07# *# 0.9999997060000#
MC#57# {BPF,PMAIVY}## 1.22E*08# 2.45E*08# *# 0.9999999755039#
MC#58# {BPF,SVSOPY}## 4.08E*11# 8.17E*11# *# 0.9999999999183#
MC#59# {BPF,MRYP}## 2.94E*07# 5.88E*07# *# 0.9999994120000#
MC#60# {BPF,YPF}## 4.90E*09# 9.80E*09# 7.01E*06# 0.9999929920620#
MC#61# {BPF,MUXY}## 2.35E*10# 4.70E*10# *# 0.9999999995296#
MC#62# {MUXB,SVFOY}## 4.52E*11# 9.03E*11# *# 0.9999999999097#
MC#63# {MUXB,HLRCY}## 2.70E*09# 5.41E*09# *# 0.9999999945904#
MC#64# {MUXB,EEPFY}## 7.06E*09# 1.41E*08# *# 0.9999999858880#
MC#65# {MUXB,PMAIVY}## 5.88E*10# 1.18E*09# *# 0.9999999988242#
MC#66# {MUXB,SVSOPY}## 1.96E*12# 3.92E*12# *# 0.9999999999961#
MC#67# {MUXB,MRYP}## 1.41E*08# 2.82E*08# *# 0.9999999717760#
MC#68# {MUXB,YPF}## 2.35E*10# 4.70E*10# *# 0.9999999995296#
MC#69# {MUXB,MUXY}## 1.13E*11# 2.26E*11# 3.36E*07# 0.9999996639817#
MC#70# {LSMAV,ELSA}## 1.37E*10# 2.74E*10# 5.85E*08# 0.9999999415072#
MC#71# {ELCLB,ELCLY}## 1.77E*06# 3.54E*06# *# 0.9999964622000#
MC#72# {ELCLB,SPVCLY}## 1.40E*06# 2.79E*06# *# 0.9999972070000#
MC#73# {ELCLB,MPVY}## 2.33E*06# 4.66E*06# *# 0.9999953450000#
MC#74# {SPVCLB,ELCLY}## 1.40E*06# 2.79E*06# *# 0.9999972070000#
MC#75# {SPVCLB,SPVCLY}## 1.10E*06# 2.21E*06# *# 0.9999977950000#
MC#76# {SPVCLB,MPVY}## 1.84E*06# 3.68E*06# *# 0.9999963250000#
MC#77# {MPVB,ELCLY}## 2.33E*06# 4.66E*06# *# 0.9999953450000#
MC#78# {MPVB,SPVCLY}## 1.84E*06# 3.68E*06# *# 0.9999963250000#
MC#79# {MPVB,MPVY}## 3.06E*06# 6.13E*06# *# 0.9999938750000#
MC#80# {SVFOY,SEMAB,SEMBB}## 1.36E*12# 2.73E*12# 2.88E*10# 0.9999999997122#
MC#81# {HLRCY,SEMAB,SEMBB}## 8.17E*11# 1.63E*10# 1.72E*08# 0.9999999827598#
MC#82# {EEPFY,SEMAB,SEMBB}## 2.13E*10# 4.26E*10# 4.50E*08# 0.9999999550255#
MC#83# {PMAIVY,SEMAB,SEMBB}## 1.77E*11# 3.55E*11# 3.75E*09# 0.9999999962527#
MC#84# {SVSOPY,SEMAB,SEMBB}## 5.92E*14# 1.18E*13# 1.25E*11# 0.9999999999875#
MC#85# {MRYP,SEMAB,SEMBB}## 4.26E*10# 8.52E*10# 8.99E*08# 0.9999999100510#
MC#86# {YPF,SEMAB,SEMBB}## 7.10E*12# 1.42E*11# 1.50E*09# 0.9999999985009#
MC#87# {MUXY,SEMAB,SEMBB}## 3.41E*13# 6.82E*13# 7.20E*11# 0.9999999999280#
APPENDIX C. FAULT TREE ANALYSIS 82
!
MC#88# {SVFOY,PLCAB,PLCBB}# 4.65E*14# 9.29E*14# 1.06E*11# 0.9999999999894#
MC#89# {HLRCY,PLCAB,PLCBB}## 2.78E*12# 5.57E*12# 6.37E*10# 0.9999999993634#
MC#90# {EEPFY,PLCAB,PLCBB}# 7.26E*12# 1.45E*11# 1.66E*09# 0.9999999983394#
MC#91# #{PMAIVY,PLCAB,PLCBB}# 6.05E*13# 1.21E*12# 1.38E*10# 0.9999999998616#
MC#92# #{SVSOPY,PLCAB,PLCBB}## 2.02E*15# 4.03E*15# 4.61E*13# 0.9999999999995#
MC#93# {MRYP,PLCAB,PLCBB}## 1.45E*11# 2.90E*11# 3.32E*09# 0.9999999966787#
MC#94# #{YPF,PLCAB,PLCBB}# 2.42E*13# 4.84E*13# 5.54E*11# 0.9999999999446#
MC#95# {MUXY,PLCAB,PLCBB}# 1.16E*14# 2.32E*14# 2.66E*12# 0.9999999999973#
MC#96# {SEMAY,SEMBY,SCFOB}# 1.36E*12# 2.73E*12# 2.88E*10# 0.9999999997122#
MC#97# {PLCAY,PLCBY,SCFOB}# 4.65E*14# 9.29E*14# 1.06E*11# 0.9999999999894#
MC#98# {SEMAY,SEMBY,HLRCB}# 8.17E*11# 1.63E*10# 1.72E*08# 0.9999999827598#
MC#99# {PLCAY,PLCBY,HLRCB}## 2.78E*12# 5.57E*12# 6.37E*10# 0.9999999993634#
MC#100# {SEMAY,SEMBY,EEPFB}## 2.13E*10# 4.26E*10# 4.50E*08# 0.9999999550255#
MC#101# {PLCAY,PLCBY,EEPFB}# 7.26E*12# 1.45E*11# 1.66E*09# 0.9999999983394#
MC#102# {SEMAY,SEMBY,PMAIVB}## 1.77E*11# 3.55E*11# 3.75E*09# 0.9999999962527#
MC#103# {PLCAY,PLCBY,PMAIVB}## 6.05E*13# 1.21E*12# 1.38E*10# 0.9999999998616#
MC#104# {SEMAY,SEMBY,SVSOPB}## 5.92E*14# 1.18E*13# 1.25E*11# 0.9999999999875#
MC#105# {PLCAY,PLCBY,SVSOPB}## 2.02E*15# 4.03E*15# 4.61E*13# 0.9999999999995#
MC#106# {MRBP,SEMAY,SEMBY}# 4.26E*10# 8.52E*10# 8.99E*08# 0.9999999100510#
MC#107# {MRBP,PLCAY,PLCBY}## 1.45E*11# 2.90E*11# 3.32E*09# 0.9999999966787#
MC#108# {BPF,SEMAY,SEMBY}## 7.10E*12# 1.42E*11# 1.50E*09# 0.9999999985009#
MC#109# {BPF,PLCAY,PLCBY}## 2.42E*13# 4.84E*13# 5.54E*11# 0.9999999999446#
MC#110# {MUXB,SEMAY,SEMBY}# 3.41E*13# 6.82E*13# 7.20E*11# 0.9999999999280#
MC#111# {MUXB,PLCAY,PLCBY}## 1.16E*14# 2.32E*14# 2.66E*12# 0.9999999999973#
MC#112# {[SEMAY,SEMBY],[SEMAB,SEMBB]}# 1.03E*14# 3.29E*14# 3.46E*10# 0.9999999996541#
MC#113# {[PLCAY,PLCBY],[SEMAB,SEMBB]}## 3.51E*16# 1.12E*15# 1.27E*11# 0.9999999999873#
MC#114# {[SEMAY,SEMBY],[PLCAB,PLCBB]}## 3.51E*16# 1.12E*15# 1.27E*11# 0.9999999999873#
MC#115# {[PLCAY,PLCBY],[PLCAB,PLCBB]}# 1.20E*17# 3.83E*17# 4.72E*13# 0.9999999999995#
# # # #
PFDsif# 7.66E*04#
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